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This dissertation includes three essays on the application of economics to various aspects 
of crime and criminal activity. The research presented in this dissertation points out a cause and a 
consequence of crime as well as the possible influence of a law on criminal activity. The first 
chapter provides an introduction to the ways that economic reasoning can be used to analyze 
criminal activity. The second chapter examines individuals‟ gun carrying activity in the presence 
of concealed weapon laws. The results suggest that allowing law-abiding individuals to carry 
concealed handguns is more likely to reduce crime than to increase it. Chapter 3 investigates the 
effect of joblessness on criminal activity using an international panel data set. The results 
indicate that increase in unemployment causes more property crimes. The fourth chapter presents 
evidence for the existence of a negative externality of crime. Countries that have higher crime 
rates suffer from the loss of international tourists and tourism revenue. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
findings of the dissertation, provides concluding remarks, and discusses opportunities for future 
research in the economics of crime. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to the statistics presented in FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports, in 1960s, on 
average twenty five in every one thousand U.S. residents were victims of a crime.
1
 About two of 
those thirty five victims were victims of a violent crime (murder, rape, robbery or assault). Such 
high crime rates terrorized the potential victims and bring about fear of crime. Motivated by the 
high incidence of crime, economists have started investigating the topic. It became clear that 
crime can be analyzed with the tools of economics with Becker (1968) who proposed the idea 
that individuals respond to incentives when they decide about participating in criminal activity. 
Becker (1968) suggested that individuals compare the possible costs and benefits of committing 
a crime, and they (do not) engage in criminal activity if their expected benefits are (smaller) 
greater than costs. As crime rates have gotten worse over time, economists have studied criminal 
activity more extensively. The national violent crime rate increased from 363 per 100,000 
individuals in 1970 to 429 per 100,000 individuals in 2009. Several authors have investigated 
different aspects of criminal activity contributing to the economics of crime literature. 
The three pieces of my research presented in three chapters of this dissertation contribute 
to the economics of crime literature. Specifically, in the next chapter I investigate the contentious 
issue of the impact of shall-issue laws on crime. Although previous research has investigated this 
question extensively, there is no consensus on the impact of shall-issue laws on crime. A shall-
issue law allows law-abiding individuals to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns 
provided that they satisfy some requirements indicated by the law. Previous researchers have 
overlooked the fact that such a law may or may not influence crime depending on the type of the 
individuals that respond to the shall-issue law by carrying handguns more frequently. For 
example, if potential victims start carrying guns more frequently when a shall-issue law is 
enacted, then they can better protect themselves and others. In this case, the shall-issue law can 
have a crime-reducing effect. However, if potential criminals start carrying handguns more 
frequently after a shall-issue law is enacted, then the shall-issue law may have a crime-
facilitating effect. Recognizing the mechanisms through which the shall-issue laws may 
influence crime, the study presented in the second chapter acknowledges the fact that shall-issue 
laws cannot influence crime unless individuals start carrying guns more frequently as a response. 
Consequently, the investigated research questions are twofold. First is whether individuals 
respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more frequently. The second research question 
involves whether potential victims or criminals respond to these laws. This approach is novel in 
the literature. 
The third chapter of this dissertation investigates the impact of unemployment on crime 
using a country-level panel data set from Europe that contains consistently-measured crime 
statistics. As indicated above, criminal activity is primarily motivated by net relative benefits to 
illegal activities. One implication of this idea is that individuals with potentially better current 
and future opportunities in the legal labor market are less likely to commit crime.  One 
determinant of these opportunities in the labor market is the unemployment rate, which fluctuates 
over the business cycle. During a recession, when the unemployment rate goes up, employment 
chances in the legal labor market diminish. During times of high unemployment, the relative 
benefit of working in the legal labor market for an individual decreases on the margin, increasing 
the crime rate in the country.  Using data from one single country, several studies confirm that 
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 Average of 1960-1969. Only the victims of FBI‟s Index I crimes are counted. 
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unemployment increases crime. However, in an international context, the impact of 
unemployment on crime has not been studied extensively. Moreover, there are only a handful of 
studies which investigate other aspects of crime using country-level data sets. The primary 
reason for the paucity of research based on international data is the absence of comparable crime 
statistics across countries. Legal practices, such as definitions and recording methods of crimes 
differ across countries.  
In the study presented in the third chapter, differences in legal practices such as the 
differences in crime definitions across countries are accounted for. The employed crime data 
have the advantage of having consistent measures of crime across countries as explained in more 
detail below. Consequently, one of the contributions of this research is the introduction of a 
panel data set that can be used to study crime in an international context. In addition, the third 
chapter contributes to the economics of crime literature by being the first to investigate the 
impact of unemployment on crime by employing a uniformly collected international data set 
from European countries. Further, recognizing the fact that the unemployment rate may be 
endogenous, the third chapter uses IV models which employ novel instruments. Specifically, the 
exchange rate movements, industrial accidents and earthquakes are used as instruments for the 
unemployment rate.  
The fourth chapter of this dissertation provides evidence for the existence of one of the 
several possible negative externalities associated with crime. Specifically, using the international 
crime data set that has been introduced in the third chapter, the fourth chapter demonstrates that 
the countries that have higher crime rates suffer from greater losses of international tourism 
revenue and number of international tourists. This finding suggests that international tourists 
consider the risk of victimization when choosing a location to visit. Violent crimes (murder, 
rape, robbery, and assault), but not property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft), 
are negatively associated with incoming international tourists and international tourism revenue. 
The influence of crime on tourism activity is smaller in magnitude in Southern European 
countries with a coastline which are generally more attractive tourist destinations in terms of sea 
tourism, suggesting that victimization risk and attractiveness of the destination may be 
substitutable traits. 












A shall-issue law allows any individual, who meets state-specified requirements, to 
obtain a license to carry concealed handguns.
2
 Previous research has identified two main effects 
of shall-issue laws on crime. The crime-reducing effect predicts that shall-issue laws will 
increase a potential criminal‟s cost of committing a crime.  For example, potential victims in 
states with shall-issue laws (shall-issue states) are more likely to carry concealed weapons. As a 
result, they can more easily protect themselves against offenders compared to the potential 
victims in states without shall-issue laws (non-shall-issue states).
3
 Because potential criminals 
cannot observe who is carrying a gun, they cannot be sure if their potential victims will fight 
back with force. Consequently, a potential criminal‟s cost of committing a crime increases due to 
greater possibility of armed resistance.  
Some studies have found evidence that shall-issue laws can increase crime because of the 
crime-facilitating effect.  Numerous mechanisms can generate the crime-facilitating effect. A 
shall-issue law may increase the availability of guns to criminals if, for example, a gun in good 
hands is transferred to a criminal through theft.  It could also be the case that a potential victim 
may “convert” into a criminal because carrying a gun reduces the cost of committing a crime. In 
addition, potential criminals who observe that potential victims carry guns more frequently may 
start carrying guns more often. Consequently, if the victim retaliates, the probability of a fatal 
injury increases. This leads to an increase in the number of more-violent crimes (Levitt and 
Donohue, 1998). 
As both the crime-reducing and crime-facilitating effects of shall-issue laws are plausible, 
it is an empirical issue to estimate the net effect of shall-issue laws on crime. Despite the 
investigation this effect by numerous studies, no consensus has emerged on the issue. For 
example, Lott and Mustard (1997), Lott (1998a, 1998b), Polsby (1995), Olson and Malt (2001), 
Moody and Marvell (2009) and Moody (2001) have argued that the enactment of shall-issue laws 
decreases crime. Conversely, several other researchers, such as Black and Nagin (1998), Ludwig 
(1998), Rubin and Dezhbakhsh (2003) and Ayres and Donohue (2003, 2009) suggest that shall-
issue laws do not reduce crime, and that they actually increase crime. Differences in the 
estimated net effect of shall-issue laws on crime are shown to depend on the researchers‟ choices 
of econometric method, model specification and the particular data set employed.  
These studies have not investigated the presumed mechanisms underlying the net effect 
of shall-issue laws on crime, which is vital to proving causality. If the conditions necessary for 
the crime-reducing and crime facilitating effects are not satisfied, then the existence of these 
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 These criteria include satisfying the minimum age requirement, having no arrest record, no history of alcohol 
addiction or drug abuse as well as no signs of mental incapacitation. 
3
 Some states employ may-issue laws (may-issue states), which grant concealed weapon licenses only at the 
discretion of the license-issuing authority to individuals who satisfy the criteria mentioned. Vermont has no 
restrictions on gun carrying. Illinois and Wisconsin are referred to as no-issue states as they prohibit concealed 
carrying. Those states which have shall-issue laws or no restrictions for carrying a handgun will be referred to as 
Shall-Issue States. The remaining states (states which have may-issue laws in effect and no-issue states) will be 
referred to as Non-Shall-Issue States. The Appendix lists state-specific information pertaining to shall-issue status of 
the states, time of the enactment of their concealed weapon laws (if one is ever enacted), the laws or statues of the 
states which form the basis of their shall-issue statuses and the minimum age requirements. 
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effects is questionable. For example, if individuals do not respond to shall-issue laws by carrying 
guns in the first place, neither the crime-facilitating nor crime-reducing effects can be observed.  
To make the point using a different domain, as an example, consider the case of highway 
speed limits. The research question is whether an increase in speed limits increases traffic 
fatalities. Here, the first-order question is whether an increase in speed limits induces people to 
drive faster. If the answer is affirmative, then the second order question is whether driving faster 
leads to more traffic fatalities. The number of fatalities may go up or down depending on the 
number of individuals who start driving more carefully to protect themselves when they observe 
others who drive fast. However, if initially no driver changes his/her driving speed, no change in 
the number of accidents is expected. In other words, if the first-order effect does not take place, 
the second-order effect will not be observed and therefore the net effect of the law should be 
zero. 
Similarly, shall-issue laws intend to change the gun carrying behavior of individuals. 
Consequently, the first-order question is whether shall-issue laws increase the number of 
individuals who carry handguns. If individuals do not change their behavior, then neither the 
crime-facilitating effect nor the crime-reducing effect can exist. Acknowledging this possibility, 
this study investigates whether individuals respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns 
more frequently in the first place. 
Unlike the previous research that employed county or state-level data sets, I use an 
individual-level panel data set obtained from NLSY97, which consists of young individuals who 
are observed annually between 1997 and 2007. Using NLSY97 allows me to investigate the first-
order question of whether individuals respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more 
frequently.  I begin with an analysis of whether a law abiding individual‟s probability of carrying 
a gun increases when he/she becomes eligible to carry a handgun because of shall-issue laws. 
Secondly, I investigate whether a potential criminal‟s tendency to carry a gun changes as a 
consequence of shall-issue laws. If potential criminals become more likely to carry guns in the 
presence of shall-issue laws, then a crime-facilitating impact of shall-issue laws is possible. 
Recognizing that individuals are likely to be different based on the severity of crimes they 
commit (serious crimes such as murder, rape and robbery versus misdemeanors such as drug 
possession, public order and traffic offenses), I further analyze whether potential criminals who 
are likely to commit serious crimes and misdemeanors respond to shall-issue laws differently in 
terms of carrying a gun. Finally, using a state-level data set, I investigate whether shall-issue 
laws are associated with increases in the number of stolen guns, because gun theft is one of the 
main mechanisms through which potential criminals have access to guns. 
Estimation of the influence of becoming eligible to carry concealed weapons on 
individuals‟ probability of carrying handguns is not straightforward. It is plagued with empirical 
difficulties due to individuals‟ unobservable characteristics. Specifically, individuals who have 
greater criminal human capital are more likely to have an arrest record and therefore be ineligible 
to legally carry a concealed weapon. At the same time they have a greater tendency to carry a 
gun. As a result, the unobservable individual characteristics may drive both being eligible and 
the tendency to carry a handgun. This leads to biased estimates.  
To overcome this hurdle, I separate the estimation samples based on individuals‟ arrest 
records similar to Grogger (1995). Individuals with an arrest record as of the last wave of 
NLSY97 (in 2007 when they are 25 years old on average) are considered to have a greater level 
of criminal human capital. The remaining individuals who have never been arrested have a 
smaller level of criminal human capital.  Conducting the estimation separately on these groups 
5 
 
reduces bias due to unobserved characteristics of individuals. This is because, the unobservable 
characteristics will have similar influences on individuals‟ gun carrying probability within these 
groups. Therefore, this strategy will yield a comparison of eligible and ineligible individuals‟ 
gun carrying probabilities which are similarly influenced by their unobservable characteristics.  
As a further classification, individuals who have an arrest record are categorized 
according to the severity of the crimes they commit. This categorization generates more 
homogenous estimation samples. Individuals who have committed serious crimes (FBI‟s Index I 
crimes) are considered to have greater level of criminal human capital than those who commit 
minor crimes (misdemeanors). Later in the paper, I investigate whether individuals who commit 
serious and minor crimes are different from those who do not commit any crimes in terms of 
their observable outcomes. The observable outcomes considered include education level, labor 
market experiences, family characteristics, marriage choices and mental health. 
As explained in more detail below, the findings in this paper provide evidence for the 
possible existence of only the crime-reducing effect of shall-issue laws. Specifically, the findings 
indicate that the presence of a shall-issue law increases the probability of carrying a handgun for 
an individual who is unlikely to commit serious crimes such as manslaughter, rape and robbery. 
Conversely, the probability of carrying a handgun for an individual who is likely to commit 
serious crimes does not change because of shall-issue laws. Lastly, the findings obtained from a 
state panel data set reveal that gun thefts are not related to shall-issue laws. Taken together, these 
results imply that some of the conditions for the crime-facilitating effect of shall-issue laws are 
not satisfied.  Therefore, the existence of a crime-facilitating effect is questionable. 
 
 
2.2 Individual-Level Data 
 
The main data set used for the individual-level analysis is obtained from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort (NLSY97). The NLSY97 consists of a nationally 
representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who were 12 to 16 years old as of 
December 31, 1996. The first round of the survey took place in 1997, with annual interviews 
until 2007 (the last year used in this analysis). As of the last wave, the oldest individual is 27 
years old and the average age is 25. The survey contains detailed information on a variety of 
topics including an individual‟s criminal activity and gun carrying behavior. 
The key outcome variable in this paper is constructed based on individual responses to 
the yes/no question “Have you carried a handgun since the last interview?  When we say 
handgun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The indicator variable Gun takes 
the value of one if the individual has reported that he/she has carried a handgun. This question is 
appropriate in the context of studying the impact of shall-issue laws, since these laws only 
involve handguns that can be carried in a concealed fashion.
4
 As presented in Table 2.1, five 
percent of the sample reports having carried a gun. 
In each wave of the survey the respondents are asked whether they have been arrested 
since the date of the last interview.
5
 If an individual has been arrested, they are asked to provide 
additional information about the offense they were arrested for.  An individual can report having 
been charged with 11 possible offenses.
6
 A dichotomous variable is created for each of these 
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 Shot guns and rifles are too large to be carried in a concealed fashion. 
5
 In the first wave, the respondents are asked whether they have ever been arrested. 
6
 These categories are limited by the questions posed to the respondents. 
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offenses to indicate whether an individual has been arrested for the specified crime. Violence 
covers all assaults such as such as battery, rape, aggravated assault, and manslaughter. Robbery 
is defined as taking something from someone using a weapon or by force. Stealing without force 
(auto thefts, larcenies, or shop-lifting) is categorized as Theft. Any offense which involves 
breaking into private property, without permission, in an attempt to steal is counted as a 
Burglary. Destruction of Property covers offenses such as vandalism, arson and malicious 
destruction. Offenses of fencing (knowingly buying stolen property for later re-sale), receiving, 
possessing or selling stolen property are considered Other Property Offenses. Possession or use 
of illicit drugs and sale or trafficking of illicit drugs are included in Drug Possession and Drug 
Sale, respectively. Major Traffic Offenses are those such as driving under the influence, reckless 
driving, or driving without a license. Public Order Offenses include drinking or purchasing 
alcohol under age, disorderly conduct and sex offenses. The remaining offenses are grouped into 
Other Offenses. Consistent with the national distribution of crimes, a quick glance at Table 2.1 
reveals that individuals in the sample are associated with committing more misdemeanors such 
as drug possession, public order and major traffic offenses compared to felonies. 
The variables of interest in this study are Law, Adult and Ever Arrested. Law is an 
indicator for a shall-issue state in a given year. It is obtained from Ayres and Donohue (2009) 
and merged with the individual-level data set.
7
 More than half of the observations are in shall-
issue states (59 percent). Adult denotes whether an individual is at least as old as the minimum 
required age in their state of residence. The minimum required age ranges between 18 and 23.
8
 
The ages of the individuals in the sample range between 12 and 18 in the first wave of the survey 
and 22 and 27 in the last wave. Overall, in 45 percent of the observations, individuals satisfy the 
minimum age requirements of the states where they reside. Finally, Ever Arrested is an indicator 
for whether an individual has ever been arrested as of the interview date. 
The estimation strategy employed in the paper groups individuals according to their arrest 
records as of the last available survey date (2007 wave).
9
 Law Abiding Individuals are defined as 
those who have never been arrested as of the last available interview date. Arrestees, on the other 
hand, have an arrest record as of the last available interview date and make up about 30 percent 
of the whole sample.
10
  Arrestees are further categorized according to the severity of the crimes 
they have committed: those who have an arrest record for at least one of the offenses listed as 
Index-I crimes by FBI (Murder, Rape, Robbery, Assault, Burglary, Larceny, Motor Vehicle 
Theft and Arson) are classified as Serious Crime Arrestees. The individuals who have committed 
less severe crimes such as misdemeanors (public order offenses, major traffic offenses, drug 
possession and sale and so on) are grouped into Minor Crime Arrestees.  The majority of the 
sample of Arrestees is composed of Minor Crime Arrestees (60 percent). Those Arrestees who 
have committed both serious and minor crimes are included in Serious Crime Arrestees group. 
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  http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/66/. Ayres and Donohue (2009) treat may-issue states which are de facto 
shall-issue state as a shall-issue state. Alabama is one example. Further, Vermont has no restrictions on carrying 
guns. Consequently, it is considered a shall-issue state. 
8
 The states that do not have a shall-issue or may-issue law have not defined a minimum required age. In such cases, 
the minimum required age for other gun laws such as those regulate owning and purchasing guns are employed in 
the empirical analysis. The details are provided in the Appendix. 
9
 The last available interview is used for those individuals whose information was missing in the 2007 wave (due to 
non-participation). 
10
 This is consistent with Grogger (1998) who reports that one-fourth of the sample he obtained from NLSY 79 
Cohort report having committed a property crime. In the same paper, it is argued that about a third of the individuals 
in California and Philadelphia have been arrested at least once before their thirties. 
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Dependent Variables      
Gun 0.047 0.030 0.086 0.107 0.072 
Violence 0.008  0.024 0.060  
Robbery 0.003  0.011 0.027  
Burglary 0.004  0.012 0.030  
Theft 0.007  0.021 0.052  
Destruction of Property 0.005  0.014 0.036  
Other Property Offenses 0.003  0.008 0.017 0.002 
Drug Possession 0.010  0.032 0.044 0.024 
Drug Sale 0.003  0.011 0.017 0.007 
Major Traffic Offenses 0.009  0.030 0.035 0.026 
Public Order Offenses 0.008  0.024 0.030 0.021 
Other Offenses 0.012  0.037 0.051 0.028 
      
Variables of Interest      
Law 0.590 0.577 0.618 0.603 0.628 
Adult 0.455 0.451 0.465 0.462 0.466 
Ever Arrested 0.222  0.700 0.793 0.638 
      
Individual-Level Control Variables     
Age 19.624 19.593 19.693 19.675 19.704 
Female 0.496 0.580 0.314 0.273 0.342 
Black 0.264 0.247 0.300 0.334 0.278 
Hispanic 0.210 0.212 0.205 0.200 0.209 
Mixed 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.013 
Can‟t Marry 0.201 0.204 0.196 0.197 0.195 
Cohabiting 0.099 0.085 0.129 0.133 0.126 
Married 0.088 0.096 0.072 0.078 0.068 
Separated 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.010 
Marital Status Missing 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
School Enrollment 0.524 0.575 0.414 0.370 0.443 
School Enrollment Missing 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Highest Grade Comp. 11.204 11.551 10.457 10.047 10.727 
HGC Missing 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.016 0.010 
Household Size 3.846 3.856 3.824 3.833 3.818 
Household Income 33673 35681 29345 26399 31288 
Household Size Missing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household Income Missing 0.368 0.372 0.359 0.347 0.367 
Heavy Drinking 1.292 0.936 2.061 2.031 2.081 
Heavy Drinking Missing 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.015 
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Marijuana 1.794 0.939 3.639 3.944 3.437 
Marijuana Missing 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Burglarized 0.152 0.136 0.187 0.196 0.181 
Burglarized Missing 0.017 0.009 0.036 0.047 0.029 
Bullied 0.194 0.172 0.242 0.249 0.238 
Bullied Missing 0.016 0.007 0.035 0.047 0.027 
Saw Someone Shot 0.110 0.077 0.180 0.216 0.157 
Saw Someone Shot Missing 0.016 0.007 0.035 0.046 0.027 
      
State-Level Control Variables     
Crime Rate
e 
4,164 4,151 4,193 4,167 4,209 
Unemployment Rate 4.960 4.970 4.938 4.947 4.932 
Victimization Probability 20.092 18.376 23.791 24.687 23.199 
Hunters‟ Share in State Pop. 0.157 0.140 0.192 0.195 0.190 
Notes to Table 2.1:  
a
 Law Abiding Individuals do not have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97 when the average age is 25. 
b
 Arrestees have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97 when the average age is 25. Arrestees sample is 
composed of Minor Crime Arrestees and Serious Crime Arrestees. 
c
 Serious Crime Arrestees, as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97, have committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of 
FBI (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft). 
d
 Minor Crime Arrestees, as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97,  have committed at least one misdemeanor but none of 
the Index-I crimes of FBI. 
e
 Total number of Index-I crimes per 100,000 individuals. 
 
 
The individual-level control variables include the Age of the individual, indicators for 
individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black 
[omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and Separated) 
and School Enrollment status.
11,12
 Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, 
Household Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last 
month the individual has drunk 5 or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the 
last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) 
or bullying before the age of 12 (Bullied) and whether the individual witnessed someone getting 
shot before the age of 12 (Saw Someone Shot). The means of these variables are presented in 
Table 2.1. 
                                                          
11
 Those individuals who are younger than 16 years old are not asked the marital status questions. They are 
identified with the indicator Can’t Marry. The reason for that is the fact that such individuals live with their parents 
and they have not satisfied the minimum age requirement to get married. 
12
 While creating the race-ethnicity categories, ethnicity is given priority. That is, all individuals who are of Hispanic 
or Latino ethnicity are classified into Hispanic category regardless of their races. Consequently, the remaining race 
categories include individuals who are non-Hispanic. The possible race categories the respondents could choose 
from include White; Black or African-American; American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut; and Asian or Pacific Islander. 
Mixed race category includes individuals who identified themselves with more than one race. 
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The empirical analyses also control for state-specific characteristics.  Particularly, the 
Crime Rate, Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability 
and the Hunters’ Share in the State’s Population are state-level control variables. The Crime 
Rate is obtained from the FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports and is defined as the total number of 
felony crimes committed in individual‟s state of residence. The Unemployment Rate is the ratio 
of the number of unemployed people to the number of people in the labor force aged 16 and 
over. It is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The race and gender specific Homicide 
Victimization Probability is the share of homicide victims in the race and gender group that the 
individual belongs to in the total number of homicide victims in the individual‟s state of 
residence. It is obtained from the FBI‟s Supplemental Homicide Reports, and is an average of the 
period between 1997 and 2005. This construction results in a Homicide Victimization Probability 
which is time invariant, but there is variation among the states and race-gender groups within 
states. Hunter’s Share in the State’s Population is the share of individuals who have reported that 
they have gone hunting at least once in their lives. This variable is the average of 1996, 2001 and 
2006. It is obtained from the 1996, 2001 and 2006 waves of the National Survey of Fishing, 
Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation conducted by the Census Bureau.
13
 The means of 
the state-level variables are also presented in Table 2.1. 
As demonstrated in column II of Table 2.1, Law Abiding Individuals (who are never 
arrested) are mostly married females with slightly higher education levels compared to the 
Arrestees (who have at least one arrest record as of the last interview). Law-Abiding Individuals‟ 
household incomes are greater and their alcohol and marijuana consumption levels are less 
frequent than Arrestees. Further, Law Abiding Individuals are less likely to be victimized. 
Within the group of Arrestees, Minor Crime Arrestees possess fewer unfavorable characteristics 
than the Serious Crime Arrestees. Minor Crime Arrestees and Law-Abiding Individuals have 
common characteristics.  
Table 2.2 provides the means of the variables employed in the empirical analyses sorted 
by whether the individual has carried a gun since the last interview. The individuals who have 
carried guns committed more crimes (both misdemeanors and felonies) than those who have not. 
Mostly married males with fewer years of schooling have carried guns. They reported consuming 
more than five alcoholic beverages in a row and using marijuana more frequently in the last 
month than did their counterparts who have not carried guns. The individuals who have carried 
guns are more likely to have been a victim of burglary or bullying and more likely to have 
witnessed someone getting shot in their childhood. They also belong to age-race categories 
which are at greater risk for homicide in their states. Carrying a gun is more common for those 
individuals who live in states in which the share of hunters in state‟s population is greater.  
Some of the previous studies, such as Glaeser and Glendon (1998) and Cook and Ludwig (1997), 
have investigated the determinants of gun ownership and gun carrying descriptively. The data 
employed in this paper provide a similar descriptive picture of gun carrying. For example, Cook 
and Ludwig (1997) argued that 14 million adults have carried firearms at least once in the last 





year. 14 million individuals made up about 7 percent of the adult population in 1994.
14
 This is 
consistent with the fact that five percent of the NLSY97 sample reported carrying a gun.
15
  
Ownership of guns does not necessarily mean carrying guns, but owning and carrying a 
gun are highly correlated. In fact, Cook and Ludwig (1997) argued that one third of the 
individuals who own a gun also reported carrying a gun at least once in the previous year. 
Glaeser and Glendon (1998) provide a list of determinants of owning a gun. As a result of the 
high correlation of owning and carrying, Glaeser and Glendon (1998)‟s findings may help check 
the validity of the data set used in this study. Glaeser and Glendon (1998) employed the 1972-
1994 waves of General Social Survey in their study. The summary statistics mentioned above 
and presented in the Table 2.2 of this paper are consistent with Glaeser and Glendon (1998). For 
example, Glaeser and Glendon (1998) reports that gun owners are less educated, married and 
older males who are likely to live in the South. These characteristics are similar to the 
individuals who have carried a gun in my sample. However, their report that higher probabilities 
of victimization and arrest are associated with smaller tendencies to own a gun contradicts the 
descriptive statistics reported in this paper obtained from NLSY97. Specifically, in my sample, 
individuals who have carried guns are more likely to have been victims of burglary, bullying, or 
to have witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. 
 
 
2.3 Individual-Level Analysis 
 
I propose that an individual‟s probability to carry a handgun is determined by his/her 
eligibility to obtain concealed weapons licenses, personal characteristics and demand for 
protection as well as the conditions in the area that he/she lives. According to criteria set by the 
shall-issue laws, in order to be eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license, an applicant must 
satisfy various requirements which are discussed below. I use the findings of Cook and Ludwig 
(1997) and Glaeser and Glendon (1998) to identify the individual determinants of gun carrying 
activity. Findings of Cook and Ludwig (1997) and Glaeser and Glendon (1998) suggest that 
individual‟s age, gender, education level, income and marital status are correlated with his/her 
probability of carrying a gun. Further, an individual is more likely to carry a gun to protect 
himself/herself, if his/her probability of being victimized is greater. Lastly, the economic 
conditions, criminal activity and gun carrying culture in his/her state further influence his/her 




                                                          
14
 Cook and Ludwig (1997) employed the National Survey of Private Ownership and Use of Firearms in their 
analysis. That survey was conducted in 1994. National adult population (18 and over) in 1994 was about 190 
million. Source: Census Bureau. 
15
 This difference between Cook and Ludwig (1997)‟s 7% and NLSY‟s 5% may be due to the differences in the 
samples employed. Cook and Ludwig (1997)‟s sample is older and wealthier than the sample of NLSY97. 
Individuals‟ ages and their income may be significant determinants of carrying and owning guns. For example, a 
wealthier individual is more likely to demand greater protection than a poorer individual does. Similarly, an older 
individual is weaker than a younger individual in terms of resistance to offenders. As a consequence, an older 
individual may demand carry guns more than a younger individual does. Further, the 14 million (7%), reported by 
Cook and Ludwig (1997), is the share of individuals who is estimated to be carrying firearms, whereas 5% reported 
in this paper is the share of individuals who carry handguns. 
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Table 2.2 Means of the Individual-Level Variables Conditional on Carrying a Gun 
 




Have Not Carried a Gun 
N=80,901 
Variables of Interest   
Law 0.661 0.586 
Adult 0.436 0.456 
Ever Arrested 0.416 0.212 
   
Crimes Committed   
Violence 0.044 0.006 
Robbery 0.030 0.002 
Burglary 0.027 0.003 
Theft 0.037 0.005 
Destruction of Property 0.032 0.003 
Other Property Offenses 0.022 0.002 
Drug Possession 0.048 0.008 
Drug Sale 0.024 0.002 
Major Traffic Offenses 0.037 0.008 
Public Order Offenses 0.026 0.007 
Other Offenses 0.052 0.010 
   
Personal Characteristics   
Age 19.380 19.637 
Female 0.147 0.514 
Black 0.268 0.264 
Hispanic 0.210 0.210 
Mixed 0.007 0.010 
Can‟t Marry 0.223 0.200 
Cohabiting 0.097 0.099 
Married 0.105 0.088 
Separated 0.012 0.008 
Marital Status Missing 0.005 0.004 
School Enrollment 0.442 0.528 
School Enrollment Missing 0.003 0.001 
Highest Grade Completed 10.607 11.234 
HGC Missing 0.010 0.009 
Household Size 3.812 3.848 
Household Income 34,415 33,636 
Household Size Missing 0.000 0.000 
Household Income Missing 0.362 0.368 
Heavy Drinking 2.815 1.217 
Heavy Drinking Missing 0.015 0.010 
Marijuana 4.572 1.656 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
 




Have Not Carried a Gun 
N=80,901 
Marijuana Missing 0.003 0.002 
Burglarized 0.189 0.151 
Bullied 0.242 0.192 
Saw Someone Shot 0.215 0.105 
Burglarized Missing 0.025 0.017 
Bullied Missing 0.024 0.016 
Saw Someone Shot Missing 0.024 0.016 
   
State Characteristics   
Crime Rate
b
 4,286 4,158 
Unemployment Rate 4.913 4.963 
Victimization Probability 27.271 19.734 
Hunters‟ Share in State Pop. 0.251 0.152 
Notes to Table 2.2: 
a
 Reported having carried a handgun since the date of last interview. The original question that this variable is built 
on is “Have you carried a hand gun since the last interview?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other 
than a rifle or shotgun.” 
b
 Total number of Index-I crimes per 100,000 individuals. 
 
 




ist = B1Lawst + B2Adultist + B3Ever Arrestedist + B12LawstAdultist + B13Lawst Ever 




ist measures propensity to carry a gun of individual i who lives in state s in period t. 
An individual‟s propensity to carry a gun is unobservable, but an indicator variable, Gunist, for 




 If the error term vist is normally distributed, 
then the result is a single-equation probit specification. 
Lawst is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the state where the individual 
resides is a shall-issue state in period t.
17
 Adultist indicates whether the individual i is old enough 
to satisfy the minimum age requirement to obtain a concealed weapon license in state s in year t. 
The minimum required age varies between 18 and 23 across states.
18
 Ever Arrestedist is an 
indicator variable for whether the individual i has ever been arrested as of the interview date at 
year t. The vector Xist includes both individual-level control variables (age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, education, household income and size, alcohol and marijuana 
consumption, whether the individual was victimized by burglary or bullying before the age of 12 
and whether the individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12) and state-level 
                                                          
16
 The Gun variable is constructed based on the answers of the individuals to the following question: “Have you 
carried a hand gun since the last interview?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or 
shotgun.” 
17
 States‟ Concealed Weapon Law statuses are obtained from Ayres and Donohue (2009). The details are discussed 
in the Individual-Level Data and the Appendix. 
18
 See the Individual-Level Data and Appendix for further details. 
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control variables (Crime Rate, Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide 
Victimization Probability and the Hunters‟ Share in the State‟s Population). The descriptions of 
these variables are discussed in the Individual-Level Data section. 
An individual is eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license only if he/she (a) lives in a 
shall-issue state, (b) meets the minimum age requirement and (c) has no arrest record, history of 
alcoholism, drug addiction or mental incapacity.
19
 In equation (2.1) all of these criteria are taken 
into consideration. Individual‟s alcohol consumption and drug use (proxied by marijuana use) 
are also included as control variables.  
Estimation of equation (2.1) allows for a test for whether an individual becomes more 
likely to carry a handgun when he/she becomes eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license. 
The gun carrying probability of an individual is expected to go up in the presence of a shall-issue 
law. This is because, a shall-issue law in effect is the first condition for being eligible, and it 
reduces the cost of carrying a gun. However, a shall-issue law may also increase the probability 
of carrying a gun even if an individual is not eligible.
20
 That is, ineligible individuals who are 
minors (those who have not completed minimum required age) or those who have criminal 
records may have greater access to handguns when a shall-issue law is enacted. The specification 
above is flexible enough to allow for a test of these hypotheses. Inclusion of two-way and three-
way interactions of Lawst, Adultist and Ever Arrestedist allows eligible and ineligible individuals 
to have different gun carrying behaviors.  
Estimation of equation (2.1) may suffer from a potential endogeneity problem due to 
inclusion of the Ever Arrested variable.
21
 Because individuals with greater criminal human 
capital are more likely to have arrest records, they are less likely to be eligible. At the same time, 
individuals with high criminal human capital are more likely to carry a gun. Since criminal 
human capital is not observable, and it is likely to drive both individual‟s tendency to carry a gun 
and his/her eligibility status (through arrests), the estimation will be biased.  
To overcome this hurdle, I employ the identification strategy of Grogger (1995) who 
investigated the influence of arrests on wages. Since having an arrest record is not random and it 
is determined simultaneously with wages, Grogger (1995) was confronted with an endogeneity 
problem similar to the one in the context of gun carrying and being ineligible. 
The solution proposed by Grogger (1995) was to estimate a wage regression for a sample 
composed of individuals who were arrested at least once in the sample period. The individuals in 
that sample have similar unobservable characteristics, i.e. criminal human capital. Consequently, 
even if the omitted individual characteristics drive wages and arrests, their influence is similar 
                                                          
19
 The minimum age requirement is defined by the concealed weapon law of the state. Therefore, shall-issue states 
and may-issue states (which are included in non-shall-issue states) have defined a minimum age requirement. 
However, in no-restriction states (Vermont) and no-issue states (Illinois and Wisconsin) there are no concealed 
weapon laws by definition. I assign the minimum age requirements for owning a gun to the minimum age 
requirements of the states which do not have a concealed weapon law. The details are in the Appendix. 
20
 Pointed out by, for example, Ayres and Donohue (2009), Black and Nagin (1998) and Rubin and Dezhbakhsh 
(2003). 
21
 The variable Law may also be endogenous. It is possible for an individual who wants to carry a weapon to move 
to a shall-issue state and start carrying a gun there. However, this is unlikely in this data set. A total of 3,851 
observations (4.5 percent of the whole sample) have indicated a change in the state of residence during the survey 
years. Most of these moves are due to finding a job in another state and going to college in another state. Among 
those observations, in 131 cases individuals reported not carrying a gun before the move and started carrying after 
the move. Among these 131 cases only a total of 34 involve a move from a non-shall-issue state to a shall-issue 




for all individuals in the sample. Therefore, the influence of unobservable characteristics is 
eliminated when outcomes of two individuals in that sample are compared. Furthermore, because 
of the variation in the timing of first arrest, Grogger (1995) is able to identify the effect of arrests 
on wages. The wages of the individuals who do not have an arrest record but who will be 
arrested in future are not affected by their arrests. On the other hand, the wages of individuals 
who already have an arrest record at the time of the observation are influenced by their arrest 
records. In other words, individuals who do not have an arrest record but will be arrested 
eventually constitute the counter-factual for those who have been arrested previously. 
Following Grogger (1995), I estimate equation (2.1) on separate samples which consist of 
individuals that should be similar in terms of their unobserved criminal human capital. One 
sample includes only those individuals who have never been arrested up to the last survey 
(2007). The other sample is composed of only the individuals who have been arrested at least 
once as of the last survey date. The influence of the unobservable factors on the probability of 
carrying a gun and on being eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license is similar for the 
individuals within these groups. Consequently, the estimation of the impact of eligibility on gun 
carrying tendency of individuals is less likely to suffer from the endogeneity problem mentioned 
above. Moreover, there is still variation in individuals‟ eligibility status which allows for 
identification of the influence of becoming eligible on the probability of carrying a gun. There 
are various sources of the variation in eligibility. These sources include becoming eligible by 
enactment of a shall-issue law or aging to satisfy the minimum age requirement, and getting 
arrested, which makes an individual ineligible.  
 
 
2.3.1 Individuals Who Have Never Been Arrested 
 
Individuals who do not have an arrest record as of the last interview date are referred to 
as “Law Abiding Individuals.” When equation (2.1) is estimated for Law Abiding Individuals, 
the variable Ever Arrested and its interactions with Law and Adult are dropped since there is no 
variation in Ever Arrested for this sample. Consequently, the experiment in this section involves 
comparing the gun carrying probabilities of two observationally identical individuals except for 
their eligibility in terms of obtaining a concealed weapon license, who have never been arrested 
as of the last survey date (in 2007 when they are 25 years old on average).  
A Law Abiding Individual can become eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license 
through two ways: (a) enactment of a shall-issue law given he/she has satisfied the minimum age 
requirement and (b) satisfying the minimum age requirement given he/she lives in a shall-issue 
state. The model specified by equation (2.1) allows for identification of both influences on a 
Law-Abiding Individual‟s probability of carrying a gun. There is variation in both aspects of 
becoming eligible in the sample. Some states have changed their shall-issue statuses in the 
sample period of 1997-2007.
22
 Furthermore, ages of the respondents range between 12 and 27. 
As a result of the variation in the states‟ minimum age requirements, the sample includes two 
same-aged shall-issue state residents one of whom is eligible and the other is not.
23
 
                                                          
22
 These states and the years in which they become shall-issue states are as follows: Colorado-2004, Kansas-2007, 
Michigan-2002, Minnesota-2004, Missouri-2004, Nebraska-2007, New Mexico-2004, and Ohio-2005. 
23




The marginal effects that are obtained from estimation of equation (2.1) on the sample of 
Law Abiding Individuals (those who do not have an arrest records as of the last interview date) 
are presented in the first columns of Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Column I in Table 2.3 presents the 
influence of the enactment of a shall-issue law and column I in Table 2.4 presents the impact of 
satisfying the minimum age requirement on the probability of carrying a gun for Law Abiding 
Individuals. The rows pertain to the responses estimated in different subsamples. For example, 
the row 2 and column 1 of Table 2.3 presents the average marginal effect of the enactment of a 
shall-issue law on the gun carrying probabilities of Law Abiding Individuals who are as old as 
the minimum required age (i.e. Adult=1). The marginal effects presented in Table 2.3 (Table 2.4) 
are obtained by calculating the average change in the probability of carrying a gun when Law 
(Adult) is increased from zero to one while other variables are kept at their observed values.  
Enactment of a shall-issue law increases the probability of carrying a handgun for Law 
Abiding individuals on average (column I of Table 2.3). As displayed in row 1, enactment of a 
shall-issue law translates into an increase of 0.7 percentage points in a Law-Abiding Individual‟s 
probability of carrying a handgun. As observed in row 2, a Law Abiding Individual‟s probability 
of carrying a handgun increases by 1.3 percentage points in response to the enactment of a shall-
issue law, conditional on having satisfied the minimum age requirement. Row 3 shows that the 
average impact of the enactment of the law on minors (those who are younger than the minimum 
required age) is insignificant. 
Column I of Table 2.4 presents the average influence of satisfying the minimum age 
requirement on a Law Abiding Individual‟s probability of carrying a handgun. The average 
marginal effect of satisfying the minimum age requirement is not statistically different than zero 
(row 1). However, when a Law Abiding Individual in a shall-issue state turns sufficiently old 
enough to satisfy the minimum age requirement, his/her probability of carrying a handgun 
increases by 0.9 percentage point on average and this effect is significant at 1% level (row 2). 
The same impact does not significantly influence the handgun carrying probability of a Law 
Abiding Individual who resides in a non-shall-issue state (row 3). 
 
 
2.3.2 Individuals with At Least One Arrest Record 
 
In this section, I investigate the question of whether Current Arrestees and Eventual 
Arrestees carry guns more frequently because of shall-issue laws. A “Current Arrestee” is 
defined as an individual who has an arrest record as of the interview date. An “Eventual 
Arrestee” refers to an individual who does not have an arrest record at the current interview date, 






                                                          
24
 All of the individuals in the Arrestees sample had arrest records when they were interviewed in the 2007 wave of 
the survey. Among the 2,796 individuals who had at least one arrest record as of the 2007 wave, 2,067 (74%) did not 
have an arrest record as of the first interview wave (1997). 
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Table 2.3 Influence of Enactment of Shall-Issue Law on Probability of Carrying a 
Handgun 






Marginal Effect is calculated for 
  
1 Whole sample 0.007*** 0.007 
  (0.002) (0.006) 
2 Individuals Over Min. Age
a
  0.013*** 0.011 
  (0.003) (0.007) 
3 Individuals Under Min. Age
b 
0.002 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.007) 
4 Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,c 
 0.038** 
(0.015)   
5 Current Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,d 
 0.008 
   (0.008) 
6 Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,c 
 0.009 
(0.008)   
7 Current Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,d 
 -0.001 
(0.009)   
 Observations 58,023 26,919 
Notes to Table 2.3: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Law based on estimation of 
equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top.
 
Law Abiding Individuals are those who do not have an arrest record as of 
the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Arrestees have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave. The first row provides the average 
marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal effects evaluated for different 






 Ever Arrested=0, 
d
 Ever Arrested=1 
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a 
handgun since the last interview?  When we say handgun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The 
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a 
handgun when the variable Law is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Estimating equation (2.1) using the sample of Arrestees will reveal whether the Eventual 
Arrestees and Current Arrestees respond to shall-issue laws by carrying guns more frequently. 
Notice that the individuals in the Arrestees sample are similar in terms of their unobserved 
criminal human capital, i.e. they will commit a crime at least once at some point in their lives. 
However, Eventual Arrestees may be eligible to carry concealed weapons while Current 
Arrestees cannot be. These groups make up the counter-factual for each other. Specifically, the 
experiment in this section involves a comparison of the change in an Eventual Arrestee‟s 
probability of carrying a gun when he/she becomes eligible (through enactment of a shall-issue 
law or satisfying the minimum age requirement) with that of a Current Arrestee who receives the 





Table 2.4 Influence of Meeting the Minimum Required Age on Probability of Carrying a 
Handgun 
  I II  




 Marginal Effect is calculated for    
1 Whole sample 0.004 -0.004  
  (0.003) (0.007)  
2 Individuals in a Shall-Issue state
a 
0.009*** 0.003  
  (0.003) (0.008)  
3 Individuals in a Non-Shall-Issue state
b 
-0.002 -0.015*  
  (0.003) (0.009)  
4 Eventual Arrestees in Shall-Issue state
a,c 
 0.024*  
   (0.015)  
5 Current Arrestees in Shall-Issue state
a,d 
 -0.006  
   (0.008)  
6 Eventual Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue state
b,c 
 -0.016  
   (0.015)  
7 Current Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue state
b,d 
 -0.015  
   (0.009)  
 Observations 58,023 26,919  
Notes to Table 2.4: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Adult based on estimation 
of equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Law Abiding Individuals do not have an arrest record as of the 2007 
wave of NLSY97. Arrestees have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave. The first row provides the average marginal 
effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal effects evaluated for different sub-samples as 
following: 
a
 Law=1,  Law=0, 
c
 Ever Arrested=0, 
d
 Ever Arrested=1 
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you 
carried a handgun since the last interview?  When we say handgun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or 
shotgun.” The marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of 
carrying a gun when the variable Adult is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed 
values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
The average marginal effects obtained from estimation of equation (2.1) are presented in 
the second columns of Table 2.3 (the influence of the enactment of a shall-issue law) and Table 
2.4 (the influence of completing the minimum age requirement). The rows pertain to the 
responses estimated in different subsamples. For example, the fourth row in Table 2.3 presents 
the average marginal effect of the enactment of a shall-issue law on the gun carrying 
probabilities of Eventual Arrestees who are older than the minimum required age (i.e. Adult=1 
and Ever Arrested=0). The marginal effects presented in column II of Table 2.3 (Table 2.4) are 
obtained by calculating the average change in the gun carrying probabilities of Arrestees when 
the Law (Adult) variable is increased from zero to one while other variables are kept at their 
observed values. 
As presented in row 1 column II of Table 2.3, the enactment of a shall-issue law does not 
significantly increase the probability of carrying a handgun on average for Arrestees (individuals 
who are arrested or will be arrested eventually). However, an Eventual Arrestee who has 
satisfied the minimum age requirement is expected to carry handguns more frequently when a 
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shall-issue law is enacted (row 4). The same impact does not significantly change the probability 
of carrying a handgun for his Current Arrestee counterpart (row 5). A statistically significant 
response is not observed for the Eventual or Current Arrestees who have not satisfied minimum 
age requirement, when a shall-issue law is enacted (rows 6 and 7).  
The impact of satisfying the minimum age requirement on Eventual and Current 
Arrestees‟ probabilities of carrying handguns is weak. For example, as presented in column II of 
Table 2.4, the average impact of becoming eligible through fulfilling the minimum age 
requirement is insignificant in the sample of Arrestees on average (row 1). Nevertheless, in a 
shall-issue state, when an Eventual Arrestee becomes old enough to satisfy the minimum age 
requirement, his/her probability of carrying a handgun increases by 2.4 percentage points on 
average (row 4).
25
 This marginal effect is larger compared to Current Arrestees who live in shall-
issue states (row 5).  
 
 
2.3.3 Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees 
 
The previous section considers all individuals who have committed or will commit a 
crime to have similar unobservable criminal human capital. However, individuals‟ levels of 
criminal human capital may vary with the severity of crimes they commit. For example, writing 
graffiti is very different than committing a burglary. Furthermore, the results of the analysis in 
section “Can the Eligibility Criteria Successfully Determine Future Uses of Guns?” below reveal 
that Eventual Arrestees are less likely to be associated with violent crimes than are Current 
Arrestees. This difference in the criminal human capital of individuals may be reflected in their 
tendency to carry a gun.
26
  
In this section, the arrestees are categorized into two groups in order to conduct the 
estimation on more homogeneous samples. The categorization takes into consideration the 
severity of crimes committed. Specifically, individuals whose arrest records include offenses of 
Violence, Robberies, Burglaries, Thefts and Destruction of Property as of the last available 
survey date (2007) are grouped into “Serious Crime Arrestees.”
27
  Their counterparts who have 
been charged with Illicit Drug Possession and Sale, Major Traffic Offenses, Other Property 
Offenses and Other Offenses are categorized as “Minor Crime Arrestees.” If an individual has 
committed both a minor crime and a serious crime as of the last interview date, that individual is 
considered as a Serious Crime Arrestee.  
For the analysis, equation (2.1) is estimated separately over the samples of Serious and 
Minor Crime Arrestees. Similarity in the criminal human capital of the individuals in these 
samples reduces the possibility of bias due to unobservable characteristics which may affect both 
gun carrying probability and eligibility of individuals. Since this influence is similar within these 
groups, however, it will not lead to a bias in estimation. Further, the variation in the timing of 
first arrests within the Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees subsamples allows for identifying the 
impact of eligibility to obtain a concealed weapon license on carrying a handgun. That is, the 
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 However, this impact is borderline significant. 
26
 Moreover, individuals who have committed minor crimes such as traffic offenses, drug use or public order 
offenses may be eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license according to some of the states‟ laws. 
27
 This categorization of crimes follows the FBI which lists assaults, rapes, robberies, burglaries, thefts and arsons as 
Index I crimes in its Uniform Crime Reports. Index I crimes are costlier to the society and they occur more 
frequently. Destruction of Property offenses are also included in serious crimes since arson is a property destruction 
offense and it has been considered as an Index I crime by FBI since 1979. 
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individuals who are arrested in the later rounds of the survey make up the counterfactual for 
those who have been arrested previously. Those Eventual Arrestees (who do not have arrest 
records at the time of an interview but will be arrested in the future) are eligible, like Law 
Abiding Individuals, in the estimation sample. However, they are similar to the Current Serious 
or Minor Crime Arrestees in terms of their criminal human capital.
28
 
The results are provided in the Tables 2.5 and 2.6 which present the impact of enactment 
of a shall-issue law and satisfying the minimum age requirement on the probability of carrying a 
handgun, respectively. The first and second columns in each table show the results for the 
samples of Serious Crime Arrestees and Minor Crime Arrestees, respectively. The marginal 
effects presented in the first row of Table 2.5 (Table 2.6) are obtained by calculating the average 
change in the probability of carrying a handgun for the whole serious and minor crime arrestees 
samples when the variable Law (Adult) is increased from zero to one while other variables are 
kept at their observed values. The marginal effects shown in the other rows pertain to the 
responses estimated in different subsamples. For example, row 4 and column I of Table 2.5 s the 
marginal effect of the enactment of a shall-issue law calculated for the Eventual Serious Crime 
Arrestees who are older than the minimum required age (Adult=1 and Ever Arrested=0). 
Enactment of a shall-issue law does not increase the probability of carrying handguns for 
Serious Crime Arrestees (column 1 of Table 2.5). The only statistically significant impact is 
found for the Eventual Serious Crime Arrestees who are younger than the minimum required age 
at the time of the enactment. This impact is negative. However, the marginal effect presented in 
the row 1 and column II of Table 2.5 shows that the enactment of a shall-issue law increases a 
Minor Crime Arrestee‟s probability of carrying a handgun by about 1.7 percentage points. This 
influence is mainly due to the responsiveness of Eventual Arrestees to shall-issue laws. An 
Eventual Minor Crime Arrestee, who meets the minimum required age, is 4.5 percentage points 
more likely to carry a handgun in the presence of a shall-issue law compared to absence of the 
law (row 4 of column II). This is similar for an Eventual Minor Crime Arrestee who has not 
satisfied the minimum age requirement (row 2 column II).
29
  Among the Minor Crime Arrestees 
who have satisfied the minimum age requirement, the probability of carrying a gun for an 
Eventual Arrestee gun increases more than that for a Current Arrestee when a shall-issue law is 
enacted (rows 4 and 5 of column II). However, as presented in Table 2.6, satisfying the minimum 
age requirement does not significantly influence the probability of carrying a gun for Serious or 
Minor Crime Arrestees. 
The previous section‟s results suggest that Eventual Arrestees are more likely to carry 
handguns when they become eligible. The findings in this section imply that the increase in the 
handgun carrying probability of Eventual Arrestees is observed because of Eventual Minor 
Crime Arrestees. Unlike their Serious Crime Arrestee counterparts, Eventual Minor Crime 
Arrestees are very responsive to the shall-issue laws. The probability of carrying a handgun does 
not change for individuals who have committed or will commit serious crimes in the future when 
a shall-issue law is enacted. Only the Eventual Serious Crime Arrestees who are younger than 
the minimum required age reduce their frequency to carry guns in response to the enactment of 
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 In the rest of this section, definitions from the previous sections are used. That is, an individual who does not have 
a serious (minor) crime offense charge in his/her arrest record as of the current interview date is referred to as an 
Eventual Serious (Minor) Crime Arrestee. An individual who already has a serious (minor) crime offense charge in 
his/her arrest record is considered a Current Serious (Minor) Crime Arrestee. 
29
 An individual who has not satisfied the minimum age requirement may have greater access to handguns even if 
he/she is not eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license. For example, such an individual may borrow or secretly 





 On the other hand, a shall-issue law increases the tendency to carry a gun for 
an individual who will commit a minor crime in the future. Although this effect is undesirable, 
when compared to serious crimes, these minor crimes are less costly to society. 
 
 
2.4 Extensions and Robustness Checks 
 
 
2.4.1 Can the Eligibility Criteria Successfully Determine Future Uses of Guns? 
 
According to the criteria to obtain a concealed weapon license, individuals with arrest 
records (Current Arrestees) are considered to be ineligible. This is because past criminal activity 
is a determinant of future criminal activity. Current Arrestees would have been likely to use 
handguns in future criminal activity, if they were allowed to carry one. However, it is possible 
for an individual without arrest record to obtain a concealed weapon license, to start carrying a 
gun legally, and commit a crime in the future. This is because of the fact that license-issuing 
authorities cannot distinguish future criminals from the entire pool of eligible individuals. In 
other words, license-issuing authorities cannot differentiate between a Law Abiding Individual 
and an Eventual Arrestee, and thus concealed weapon licenses may be granted to future 
criminals. In support of this possibility, the findings of the section “Individuals with At Least 
One Arrest Record” suggest that Eventual Arrestees become more likely to carry handguns when 
they become eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license, unlike the Current Arrestees. As a 
consequence, these criteria can be criticized for the possibility that they may (unintentionally) 
provide concealed weapon licenses to individuals who may involve in criminal activity in the 
future. 
If Eventual and Current Arrestees commit similar crimes in the future, then granting 
concealed weapon licenses to the Eventual Arrestees may not be a sound policy. Alternatively, if 
the Eventual Arrestees do not commit crimes as severe as do the Current Arrestees, then 
allowing concealed weapons to this group may not be a critical problem.
31
 Consequently, 
whether the Current and Eventual Arrestees commit similar crimes becomes important in the 
context of testing whether the criteria adopted by shall-issue states are successful in terms of 
identifying future criminal use of guns. 
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 Notice that although insignificant, the influence of the enactment of a shall-issue law for Eventual Serious 
Arrestees who are older than the minimum required age is negative as well. However, the influence of the same 
change on Current Serious Crime Arrestees is close to zero. This overall picture may be explained by the possibility 
that Eventual Serious Crime Arrestees switch to crimes that do not require face-to-face contact with the victim and 
therefore the marginal benefit of carrying a gun is lower. On the other hand, Current Serious Crime Arrestees who 
are more experienced in committing crimes may not switch to such crimes. In fact, as will be shown in the next 
section, Eventual Arrestees are less likely to commit crimes of Violence and Robbery compared to the Current 
Arrestees. 
31
 Although all crimes are costly, minor crimes and misdemeanors such as illicit drug use, reckless driving or theft 
are far less costly than severe crimes such as homicide, rape or robbery. 
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Table 2.5 Influence of Enactment of Shall-Issue Law on Arrestees’ Probability of Carrying 
Handgun 




  I II 
 
Marginal Effect is calculated for   
1 Whole sample -0.008 0.017** 
  (0.010) (0.007) 
2 Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,c 
-0.037** 0.018* 
  (0.015) (0.010) 
3 Current Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,d 
0.004 0.010 
  (0.015) (0.012) 
4 Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,c 
-0.045 0.045** 
  (0.033) (0.018) 
5 Current Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,d 
0.002 0.016 
  (0.013) (0.010) 
 Observations 10,685 16,219 
Notes to Table 2.5: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Law based on estimation of 
equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I 
crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none 
of the Index-I crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated 






 Ever Arrested=0, 
d
 Ever Arrested=1 
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a 
hand gun since the last interview?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The 
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun 
when the variable Law is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
In this section, I investigate the types of future crimes individuals commit, conditional on 









ist is the propensity to be charged with an offense of individual i who lives in state s 
in year t. Equation (2.2) is estimated using probit over the sample of Arrestees. 
Eventualist-1 in equation (2.2) indicates whether the individual i was an Eventual Arrestee 
in the previous time period, t-1. In other words, Eventualist-1 takes the value of one if the 
individual i has never been arrested as of the previous survey wave at t-1, but he/she will 
experience his/her first arrest after the date of his/her previous interview (after t-1). Notice that 
since equation (2.2) is estimated for the sample of Arrestees, the variable Eventual identifies the 
difference between Eventual and Current Arrestees in terms of committing a crime. Gunist 
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measures whether an individual has carried a handgun since the previous interview date. The 
vector Xist includes all of the control variables as in the equation (2.1).
32
  
A variety of offenses are considered as outcome variables, which are defined in 
Individual-Level Data section. The outcome variable takes the value of one if the individual is 
charged with a specific offense. The charged offense can be one of the following: Violence, 
Robbery, Burglary, Theft, Destruction of Property, Other Property Offenses, Drug Possession, 
Drug Sale, Major Traffic Offenses, Public Order Offenses and Other Offenses.
33
 
The estimated probability of committing a crime for Eventual Arrestees who have carried 
handguns is presented in Table 2.7. The comparison group is Current Arrestees who have carried 
a handgun.  Although Table 2.7 only reports the average marginal effects estimated in the sample 
individuals who have carried a gun, equation (2.2) is estimated for the whole sample of 
Arrestees. The presented marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average change in the 
probability of committing a crime when the variable Eventual is increased from zero to one 
while other variables are kept at their observed values, for the Arrestees who have carried a 
handgun since the last interview date (Gun=1). Each row in Table 2.7 pertains to a regression 
where an indicator for the specified crime type is the dependent variable. 
 As presented in Table 2.7, among the group of individuals who have carried a handgun 
since the last interview date, those who have never been arrested as of the previous survey date 
but will be arrested after that date (Eventual Arrestees) are less likely to be associated with 
committing violent crimes and robberies compared to their counterparts who already had an 
arrest record as of the previous survey date (Current Arrestees). There is no statistical difference 
between these two groups in terms of committing other crime types.
34
 
These results indicate that Eventual Arrestees who carry a gun are less likely to commit 
violent crimes such as assault, rape, manslaughter and robberies than are Current Arrestees who 
carry a gun, although the difference is not statistically significant for other crimes.
35
 The results 
                                                          
32
 The full set of control variables includes both individual and state-level control variables. The individual-level 
control variables are the Age of the individual, indicators for individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black, 
Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black [omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and 
Separated) and School Enrollment status. Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, Household 
Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last month the individual has drunk 5 
or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the 
individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) or bullying (Bullied) before the age of 12 and whether the 
individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. The state-level control variables are the Crime Rate, 
Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability and the Hunters’ Share in the 
State’s Population. 
33
 According to the definition of NLSY, the variable Violence includes battery, rape, aggravated assault and 
manslaughter. 
34
 The results for those who have not carried guns are not reported, but they are available upon request. Briefly, 
among those Arrestees who have not carried a gun, the individuals who were Eventual Arrestees in the previous 
wave are more likely to be associated with violent crimes (at 10% significance), theft, drug possession, traffic and 
public order offenses compared to those who were Current Arrestees in the previous wave. 
35
 The main findings in this section are not surprising. The results indicate that the individuals who get arrested early 
in their lives are more likely to commit highly-severe crimes, such as assault and robbery, and less likely to commit 
less-severe crimes, such as drug possession, traffic and public order offenses, than those who get arrested later. One 
reason for this may the differences in criminal human capital. For an individual who has accumulated a greater stock 
of criminal human capital early in his/her life, it may be harder to switch to the legal sector later (Mocan and Bali, 
forthcoming). Therefore, by staying in the criminal sector, such an individual continues accumulating even more 
criminal human capital and he/she is more likely to commit more severe crimes than another individual with a 




in previous sections showed that some eligible individuals who may commit crimes in the future 
(Eventual Arrestees) carry guns more often in response to enactment of shall-issue laws. 
However, when they have carried guns, Eventual Arrestees are less likely to commit violent 
crimes compared to Current Arrestees who are considered ineligible for a concealed weapon 
license. Therefore, granting concealed weapon licenses only to the individuals who do not have 
arrest records at time of the application but not to the individuals with arrest records seems to be 
a successful method of excluding individuals who will be involved in future criminal activity, 
especially in violent offenses. 
 
 
2.4.2 Observable Differences among Arrestees and Law Abiding Individuals 
 
In the previous sections, individuals are categorized according to their arrest records. This 
categorization was based on possible differences between these individuals in terms of their 
criminal human capital. Arrestees are considered to have greater levels of criminal human capital 
than Law Abiding Individuals.  
Along the same lines, Arrestees are expected to have lower levels of legal human capital 
than Law Abiding Individuals. In this section, I investigate whether Arrestees have common 
characteristics that are associated with low levels of legal human capital and whether these 
characteristics are different from Law Abiding Individuals. In this way, I test whether the 
categorization based on arrest records is an appropriate way of classifying individuals to form 
homogeneous groups within themselves. If Arrestees and Law Abiding individuals are 
significantly different from each other in their legal human capital, then the classification based 
on the existence of arrest records in individuals‟ lifetimes is a good proxy for categorizing 
individuals according to their unobservable characteristics. Consequently, unobservable 
characteristics of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees can be thought to be similar within 
these samples.  
Previous research has provided evidence supporting the classification based on arrest 
records. For example, Grogger (1995) has shown that the current wages of individuals who will 
be arrested in the future are not very different from the wages of those who already have an 
arrest record.
36
 Further, Grogger (1995) argues that wages of those with arrest records are 
economically and statistically different than wages of individuals without arrest records.  Other 
studies, such as Williams and Sickles (2002) and Marcotte and Markowitz (2009), have argued 
that individuals who have arrest records are differentially associated with unsuccessful marriage 
and mental health outcomes as compared to individuals with no arrest record. 
To test whether Arrestees and Law Abiding Individuals differ in terms of their observable 
characteristics, the following equation is estimated for a sample that pools Law Abiding 
individuals with Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees: 
 
(2.3) Outcomei = B1Serious Crimei + B2Minor Crimei + B3Xi + vi 
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 Grogger (1995) finds that the difference is statistically significant but not economically. 
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Table 2.6 Influence of Satisfying the Minimum Age Requirement on Arrestees’ Probability 







  I II 
 Marginal Effect is calculated for   
1 Whole Sample 0.003 -0.010 
  (0.011) (0.008) 
2 Eventual Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue State
b,c 
0.020 -0.020 
  (0.039) (0.015) 
3 Current Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue State
b,d 
0.003 -0.018* 
  (0.015) (0.011) 
4 Eventual Arrestees in Shall-Issue State
a,c 
-0.007 0.010 
  (0.024) (0.016) 
5 Current Arrestees in Shall-Issue State
a,d 
0.002 -0.012 
  (0.013) (0.010) 
 Observations 10,685 16,219 
Notes to Table 2.6: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Adult based on estimation 
of equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I 
crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none 
of the Index-I crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97.The first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated 







 Ever Arrested=0, 
d
 Ever Arrested=1. 
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a 
hand gun since the last interview?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The 
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun 
when the variable Adult is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
where Outcome stands for various education levels (whether the individual has at least High 
School, Associate or Bachelor’s degree and Highest Grade Completed), labor market outcomes 
(Hourly Wages, Hours Worked per Week), family formation behaviors (being Married, 
Cohabiting, Separated and number of Children) and mental health issues (being Nervous, 
Uncalm, feeling Blue, Unhappy and Depressed). Equation (2.3) is estimated by probit (OLS) for 
binary (continuous) outcomes.  Estimation is conducted using the 2007 wave (last available 
wave) for education, labor market and family formation outcomes. However, the 2006 wave is 





Table 2.7 Eventual Arrestees’ Probability of Committing a Crime Conditional on Carrying 
a Gun 
Outcome Marginal Effect Standard Error 
Violence -0.030** (0.012) 
Robbery -0.028*** (0.010) 
Burglary -0.004 (0.010) 
Theft -0.002 (0.012) 
Property Destruction -0.007 (0.011) 
Other Prop. 0.000 (0.009) 
Drug Possession 0.016 (0.013) 
Drug Sale 0.014 (0.010) 
Major Traffic Offense 0.019 (0.013) 
Public Order Offense 0.007 (0.010) 
Other Offense -0.011 (0.014) 
Notes to Table 2.7:  The dependent variables, which are listed in the rows, are indicators for whether an individual is 
charged with the specified offense. Each row pertains to a different regression. Violence includes battery, rape, 
aggravated assault and manslaughter. The underlying coefficients are obtained from estimating equation (2.2) over 
the sample of Arrestees (who have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97). Reported marginal effects are 
the probabilities of committing the specified crime for the Eventual Arrestees who have carried a gun. The 
comparison group is Current Arrestees who have carried a gun. Eventual Arrestees do not have an arrest record at 
the time of the interview, but will be arrested in the future. Current Arrestees have an arrest record at the time of the 
interview. The marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average change in the crime committing probabilities 
for the individuals who have carried a gun (Gun=1) when the variable Eventual is increased from 0 to 1 while other 
variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
 Serious Crime and Minor Crime are indicators for being a Serious Crime and 
Minor Crime Arrestee, respectively. That is, Serious Crime (Minor Crime) takes the value of one 
if the individual has an arrest record for rape, assault, manslaughter, robbery, burglary, theft and 
destruction of property (illicit drug possession and sale, major traffic offenses, other property 
offenses and other offenses) as of the last available survey date, 2007. The vector X includes 
appropriate control variables. Specifically, the vector X includes all control variables that were 
used in equation (2.1) except, for example, the education variables (Highest Grade Completed), 
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 The full set of control variables includes both individual and state-level control variables. The individual-level 
control variables are the Age of the individual, indicators for individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black, 
Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black [omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and 
Separated) and School Enrollment status. Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, Household 
Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last month the individual has drunk 5 
or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the 
individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) or bullying (Bullied) before the age of 12 and whether the 
individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. The state-level control variables are the Crime Rate, 




Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 provide the results for education and labor market, marriage and 
family, and mental health outcomes in the last available wave, respectively. For the regressions 
with Highest Grade Completed (column 4 in 2.8), Hourly Wages and Hours Worked per Week 
(Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2.8) and number of Children (Column 4 of Table 2.9) the marginal 
effects obtained from the estimation of equation (2.3) with OLS are presented. For the remaining 
outcomes the marginal effects are obtained from probit.
38
 The reported marginal effects lay out 
the similarities and differences between Minor Crime Arrestees, Serious Crime Arrestees and the 
Law Abiding individuals as of the last wave of the survey.  
As observed in Table 2.8, both Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees are less likely to have 
at least a high school, associate or bachelor‟s degree as of the 2007 wave compared to Law 
Abiding individuals. On average, Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees complete about two and 
one fewer years of schooling, respectively than Law Abiding Individuals. Compared to their 
counterparts who commit a minor crime, Serious Crime Arrestees are less likely to obtain a high 
school or higher education degrees. Serious Crime Arrestees work more hours per week than do 
the Law Abiding Individuals, although this marginal effect is borderline significant. Serious 
Crime Arrestees‟ hourly earnings are much less. 
39,40
 There is no statistical difference between 
Minor Crime Arrestees and Law Abiding individuals in terms of hours worked per week and 
hourly wages.  
Table 2.9 presents the results of the regressions for family formation and marriage 
outcomes as of the 2007 wave interviews. Minor Crime Arrestees are less likely to be married 
and more likely to be cohabiting with a partner than Law Abiding Individuals. Serious Crime 
Arrestees are less likely to be married but they are as likely to be cohabiting as Law-Abiding 
Individuals. Additionally, Serious Crime Arrestees are less successful in maintaining their 
marriages than are Law Abiding individuals, because Serious Crime Arrestees are more likely to 
be separated or divorced from their spouses. Except for being separated, there is no statistical 
difference in family formation outcomes of Serious versus Minor Crime Arrestees. Serious 
Crime Arrestees have more children than Minor Crime Arrestees and Law Abiding Individuals. 
Further, Minor Crime Arrestees have more children than do Law Abiding Individuals as of the 
2007 wave. 
As displayed in Table 2.10, Serious Crime Arrestees have the worst mental health 
conditions on overage among all subgroups as of the 2006 wave (last available survey for these 
outcomes). They are more likely to feel blue, be nervous, unhappy, uncalm and depressed than 
the Law Abiding individuals. Minor Crime Arrestees share these unfavorable mental health 
outcomes with Serious Crime Arrestees, but they experience these negative outcomes at a 
smaller magnitude. Minor Crime Arrestees are as likely to feel blue or depressed as Law Abiding 
individuals, yet they are more likely to be nervous, uncalm and unhappy. 
 
                                                          
38
 The marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as the average change in the probability of the outcome 
when the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime are increased from zero to one while other variables 
are kept at their observed values. The marginal effects obtained from OLS are the coefficient estimates. The 
marginal effects presented in Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 are estimated for the whole sample observed in the last wave 
of the survey. 
39
 Hourly Wage Rate is scaled by 0.01. This implies the coefficient of -93 for the Serious Crime Arrestees in 
Column 5 of Table 2.8 indicate a difference of 93 cents/hour. 
40
 Hours worked per week and hourly wage regressions are conducted for the sample of individuals who reported 
participating in the labor market.  
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Table 2.8 Comparison of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees: Education and Labor 
Market Outcomes (2007 wave) 































-0.106*** -1.192*** -33.709 0.302 
(0.009) (0.070) (23.034) (0.898) 
Observations 7,345 7,345 7,345 7,290 6,366 6,483 
Notes to Table 2.8: The outcome variables are listed at the top of the columns. All columns present marginal effects 
obtained from estimation of equation (2.3) for the whole sample of individuals (Law Abiding, Minor and Serious 
Crime Arrestees) for 2007 wave. The base group is Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding Individuals have not 
committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the 
Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one 
misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Columns 4-6 provide OLS 
estimates and the remaining columns provide marginal effects obtained from probit. Hourly Wage Rate is measured 
in one hundredths of a dollar. The marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as the average change in the 
probability of the outcome when the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime are increased from zero to 
one while other variables are kept at their observed values. The marginal effects obtained from OLS are the 
coefficient estimates. The marginal effects presented are estimated for the whole sample observed in the last wave of 
the survey. Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
The findings in this section imply that Arrestees are different from Law Abiding 
individuals in various aspects of legal human capital.
41
 These differences are more significant for 
Serious Crime Arrestees than they are for Minor Crime Arrestees. However, although differences 
exist, Minor Crime Arrestees resemble to Serious Crime Arrestees at a much greater extent than 
they resemble to the Law Abiding Individuals. It is more appropriate to group Minor Crime 
Arrestees with Serious Crime Arrestees rather than with Law Abiding Individuals. In addition, 
the findings in this section imply that using arrest records to categorize individuals seems to be a 
good method of classification according to unobservable criminal human capital. If I used the 
components of legal human capital (education, labor market outcomes, family formation 
behavior, mental health issues…etc.) instead of the existence of lifetime arrest records to 
categorize individuals, then samples similar to what I employ in the previous sections of the 
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Table 2.9 Comparison of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees: Marriage and Family 
Outcomes (2007 wave) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Married Cohabiting Separated Children 
Serious Crime Arrestees -0.052*** 0.026 0.016** 0.214*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.036) 
Minor Crime Arrestees -0.055*** 0.036*** 0.003 0.127*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.026) 
Observations 7,348 7,348 7,305 7,359 
Notes to Table 2.9: 
The dependent variables are listed at the top of the columns. All columns present marginal effects obtained from 
estimation of equation (2.3) for the whole sample of individuals (Law Abiding, Minor and Serious Crime Arrestees) 
for 2007 wave. The base group is Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding Individuals have not committed any 
crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of 
FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none of 
the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Column 4 provides OLS estimates, the remaining 
columns present marginal effects obtained from probit. The marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as 
the average change in the probability of the outcome when the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime 
are increased from zero to one while other variables are kept at their observed values. The marginal effects obtained 
from OLS are the coefficient estimates. The marginal effects presented are estimated for the whole sample observed 
in the last wave of the survey. The robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
2.4.3 Differential Treatment 
 
 In this section, I check whether the results presented above are robust to a different model 
specification. This extension utilizes the variation in the exposure of states to the shall-issue 
laws. Particularly, some individuals have been living in states that enacted their shall-issue laws 
several years ago. This differential exposure of states to shall-issue laws may lead to differences 
in the handgun carrying probability of the individuals. In other words, the handgun carrying 
probability of an individual who resides in a state which enacted a shall-issue law many years 
ago may be greater (or smaller) than that of an individual whose state just recently passed a 
shall-issue law.
42
 This hypothesis may be especially important when a longer history of the 
existence of shall-issue laws implies a culture of gun carrying in a shall-issue state. 
 To test whether exposure of the states to the shall-issue laws influences the probability of 




ist = B1Exposurest + B2Adultist + B3Ever Arrestedist + B12ExposurestAdultist  
+ B13ExposurestEver Arrestedist + B23AdultistEver Arrestedist  
+ B123ExposurestAdultistEver Arrestedist + B4Xist + vist 
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 The sign of the average marginal effect can be positive or negative. For example, an individual who have been 
residing in a state that passed a shall-issue law many years ago may choose not to carry a handgun if he/she observes 
that other individuals carry handguns enough to provide him/her with protection. Alternatively, the same individual 




where Exposure is a trend variable that counts the number of years since the state that the 
individual resides passed a shall-issue law.
43
 Notice that equation (2.4) is exactly same as 
equation (2.1) except that Law is replaced with variable Exposure. All of the control variables 
employed in equation (2.1) are also included in equation (2.4).
44
 I estimate equation (2.4) by 
probit. As an alternative, I also estimate equation (2.4) including the variable Exposure and its 
square, as well as their interactions with Adult and Ever Arrested as covariates.
45
 
 The marginal effects obtained from estimating equation (2.4) over the sample of Law 
Abiding Individuals are presented in the first column of Table 2.11, which corresponds to the 
first column of Table 2.3. On average, residing in a state with an extra year of exposure to the 
shall-issue laws does not significantly increase the probability of carrying a handgun for a Law 
Abiding Individual. However, as presented in the second row and first column of Table 2.11, the 
same marginal effect calculated for the sample of Law Abiding Individuals who are older than 
the minimum age requirement is positive. The same result is found when the alternative 
specification of equation (2.4), which includes both the variable Exposure and the square of it as 
covariates, is employed. The marginal effects obtained from this specification are provided in the 
second column of Table 2.11. 
The marginal effects obtained from estimating equation (2.4) over the samples of Serious 
and Minor Crime Arrestees are presented in the Table 2.12. The counterpart to this table is Table 
2.5. Residing in a state that has greater years of exposure to shall-issue laws does not increase the 
probability of carrying a handgun for Serious Crime Arrestees (column I). This finding holds 
when both linear and quadratic Exposure are included in equation (2.4) (column II). No influence 
of residing in a state with greater exposure to shall-issue laws is estimated for Minor Crime 
Arrestees when only linear Exposure is employed in equation (2.4) (column III). However, when 
both linear and quadratic Exposure variables are controlled for, the results change. As presented 
in the column IV of Table 2.12, a Minor Crime Arrestee who resides in a state which passed a 
shall-issue law earlier is more likely to carry a handgun than his/her counterpart who resides in a 
state which has passed a shall-issue law recently. This finding holds for both Eventual and 
Current Minor Crime Arrestees, except Current Minor Crime Arrestees who have not satisfied 
the minimum age requirement.
46
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 For those states that passed a shall-issue law earlier than 1970, the enactment year is set at 1970. 
44
 The full set of control variables includes both individual and state-level control variables. The individual-level 
control variables are the Age of the individual, indicators for individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black, 
Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black [omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and 
Separated) and School Enrollment status. Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, Household 
Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last month the individual has drunk 5 
or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the 
individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) or bullying (Bullied) before the age of 12 and whether the 
individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. The state-level control variables are the Crime Rate, 
Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability and the Hunters’ Share in the 
State’s Population. 
45
 When both Exposure and the square of it are included in the equation (2.4), there are four main effects, six two-
way interactions, four three-way interactions and one four-way interaction in the equation. 
46
 Although not reported here, I calculated the marginal effect of satisfying the minimum age requirement at 
different values of Exposure. There was not a clear pattern for any subsamples (Law Abiding Individuals, Eventual 
or Current Arrestees). 
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Table 2.10 Comparison of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees: Mental Health 
Outcomes (2006 wave) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Nervous Uncalm Blue Unhappy Depressed 
Serious Crime Arrestees 0.053*** 0.083*** 0.036*** 0.084*** 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.013) (0.019) (0.007) 
Minor Crime Arrestees 0.027*** 0.029* 0.003 0.025* 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) 
Observations 7,365 7,418 7,307 7,430 7,315 
Notes to Table 2.10: The dependent variables are listed at the top of the columns. All columns present marginal 
effects obtained from estimation of equation (2.3) using probit for the whole sample of individuals (Law Abiding, 
Minor and Serious Crime Arretees) for 2006 wave. The base group is Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding 
Individuals have not committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have 
committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have 
committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The 
marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as the average change in the probability of the outcome when 
the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime are increased from zero to one while other variables are kept 
at their observed values. The marginal effects presented in Table 2.10 are estimated for the whole sample observed 
in the 2006 wave of the survey. The robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
2.4.4 Probability of Carrying a Gun in the Last Month 
 
 In this section, I test whether shall-issue laws influence tendency to carry a handgun in 
the more recent past. For this purpose, I estimate equation (2.1) employing Gun in Last Month as 
the dependent variable instead of Gun. The new dependent variable, Gun in Last Month, takes 
the value of one if the individual has indicated that he/she has carried a gun at least one day in 
the last 30 days. 
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 present the marginal effects obtained from estimating equation 
(2.1), with the dependent variable Gun in Last Month, over the samples of Law Abiding 
Individuals, Serious Crime Arrestees and Minor Crime Arrestees, separately.  The marginal 
effects associated with the enactment of a shall-issue law and satisfying the minimum age 
requirement are presented in Tables 2.13 and 2.14, respectively.  The first columns in Tables 
2.13 and 2.14 corresponds to the first columns in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Counterparts 
of the second (third) columns in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 are the first (second) columns in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6, respectively. 
The marginal effects presented in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 are very similar to those reported 
previously in Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Briefly, the probability of carrying a handgun in the 
last month for the Law Abiding Individuals increases in the presence of a shall-issue law (row 1 
column I in Table 2.13). This influence is mostly due to the Law Abiding Individuals who have 
satisfied the minimum age requirement (row 2, column I in Table 2.13). Serious Crime Arrestees 
do not change their handgun carrying behavior in the recent past with the presence of a shall-
issue law (column II in Table 2.13), whereas Minor Crime Arrestees become more likely to carry 
a handgun (column III in Table 2.13). The influence of a shall-issue law is greatest for the 
individuals who do not have an arrest record and who are old enough to satisfy the minimum age 
requirement. These individuals are 3.5 percentage points more likely to carry a handgun after the 
enactment of a shall-issue law (row 4, column III in Table 2.13). 
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Table 2.11 Influence of Exposure to a Shall-Issue Law on Probability of Carrying a 
Handgun for Law Abiding Individuals 
  I II 
  Linear Linear and Quadratic 
 Marginal Effect is calculated for   
1 Whole sample 0.0001 0.0007*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) 
2 Individuals Over Minimum Age
a
  0.0004*** 0.0009*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) 
3 Individuals Under Minimum Age
b 
-0.0001 0.0004 
  (0.0001) (0.0003) 
 Observations 58,023 58,023 
Notes to Table 2.11: This table presents the average marginal effects of the variable Exposure based on estimation of 
equation (2.4) on samples of Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding Individuals have not committed any crimes as 
of the last wave of NLSY97. The marginal effects in the first column are obtained from estimation of equation (2.4) 
including Exposure and the control variables. The marginal effects in the second column are obtained from 
estimation of equation (2.4) including both linear and quadratic Exposure together with the control variables. The 
first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal 




 Adult=0  
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a 
hand gun since the last interview?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The 
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average value of the derivative of the objective function (probit) 
with respect to the variable Exposure evaluated at the observed values of the variables. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
As presented in Table 2.14, Law Abiding Individuals who become eligible to carry a 
handgun in terms of satisfying the minimum age requirement are more likely to carry a handgun 
in the past 30 days (row 1, column I in Table 2.14). This especially holds for those who reside in 
shall-issue states (row 2, column I in Table 2.14). Satisfying the minimum age requirement does 
not increase the handgun carrying probability of the Serious or Minor Crime Arrestees (columns 
II and III in Table 2.14). 
 
 
2.4.5 Do Shall-Issue Laws Increase Gun Thefts? 
 
Some of the previous researchers, such as Cook, Molliconi and Cole (1995) and Cook 
and Ludwig (1997), argue that shall-issue laws may increase the availability of guns to potential 
criminals. For example, following the enactment of a shall-issue law, a greater number of legally 
obtained guns are vulnerable to being stolen by criminals. If more guns are stolen after the 
enactment of a shall-issue law, ineligible individuals, such as those who have committed serious 
crimes, will be more likely to carry guns after the enactment of a shall-issue law. However, 
results of the previous sections show that shall-issue laws have no influence on individuals who 
have committed serious crimes in terms of carrying a handgun. Therefore, my findings in the 




Table 2.12 Influence of Exposure to a Shall-Issue Law on Arrestees’ Probability of 
Carrying Handgun 
  Serious Crime Arrestees Minor Crime Arrestees 








  I II III IV 
 Marginal Effect is calculated for     
1 Whole Sample -0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0020*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
2 Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,c 
-0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0002 0.0029** 
  (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
3 Current Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,d 
-0.0001 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0013 
  (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0013) 
4 Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,c 
-0.0022* -0.0029 0.0004 0.0028*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
5 Current Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,d 
-0.0003 0.0009 0.0004 0.0016** 
  (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
 Observations 10,685 10,685 16,219 16,219 
Notes to Table 2.12: This table presents the average marginal effects of the variable Exposure based on estimation of 
equation (2.4) on samples of Serious Crime Arrestees (Columns I and II) and Minor Crime Arrestees (Columns III 
and IV). Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of 
NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as 
of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The marginal effects in the columns I and III are obtained from estimation of 
equation (2.4) including only Exposure and the control variables. The marginal effects in the columns II and IV are 
obtained from estimation of equation (2.4) including both linear and quadratic Exposure as well as the control 
variables. The first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to 










The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a 
hand gun since the last interview?  When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The 
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average value of the derivative of the objective function (probit) 
with respect to the variable Exposure evaluated at the observed values of the variables. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
In this section, the hypothesis that shall-issue laws increase the amount of stolen guns is 
empirically tested. Using state-level data, I investigate whether there is a difference in the 
amount of gun thefts before and after a shall-issue law is passed in a state. The model to be 
estimated is the following: 
 
(2.5) Stolen Gunsst = B1Lawst + B2Post-Passage Trendst + B3Xst + zst   
  
where Stolen Gunsst denotes the reported per capita real value of stolen guns in state s in year t. 
Despite not being the perfect measure of the number of stolen guns, the reported per capita real 
value of guns stolen is used as a proxy for the actual amount of stolen guns. This measure is 
calculated through deflating the annual value of reported stolen guns per 100,000 individuals by 
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the national Consumer Price Index (CPI). Specifically, stolen gun data obtained from the 
Supplement to Return A Master Files of UCR between 1978 and 2006. Monthly values of the 
stolen firearms are available at the police agency level, but not all agencies report monthly. To 
create the variable Stolen Guns Rate, only the data from agencies that reported the full 12 
months are employed.47 After calculating the total value of stolen guns in a state (by summing 
up the monthly figures of all agencies that report full 12 months), this annual total is divided by 
the total population covered by the agencies (times 100,000) that contributed to the annual total 
value of guns stolen.
48
 Finally, this per capita figure is deflated by the national Consumer Price 
Index. 
 The investigating officer provides information about stolen and recovered property. 
Whenever investigating a reported crime involving theft, the officer in charge includes the value 
and type of all stolen property in his/her report. This is an obligation of the investigating officer 
and as described in the Handbook of UCR: “such information is essential to assure the 
completeness of a law enforcement investigative report on stolen property.” These reports are 
summarized in the Return A Supplement forms are submitted monthly by each agency to the FBI 
headquarters or to the FBI regional offices. These forms are designed to record the total value of 
property stolen and recovered in the various classifications of properties, which include 
Firearms. As defined in the Glossary of Handbook of UCR, firearms are weapons that fire a shot 
by the force of an explosion. All handguns, rifles, shotguns, and other such devices commonly 
referred to as firearms are included in this category. The recorded value of the firearms stolen is 
left to the discretion of the reporting officer and is based upon several objective criteria. 
However, in most instances the victim's evaluation of the value of the stolen item is accepted. In 
those cases where value of the stolen item is negotiable, the current market price at the time of 
the theft is recorded. 
An individual is more likely to report a stolen gun case to the police if the gun is obtained 
legally initially. Otherwise, the reporting individual can be arrested and charged with an offense 
of illegal gun ownership. The measure of stolen guns employed in the empirical analysis is likely 
to cover most thefts of legally obtained guns. This is because, a legal gun owner is likely to 
report the theft of his/her gun to police regardless of the value of the gun. This is a protective 
measure on the part of the reporting individual against accusations of possible future crimes 
committed with the stolen gun. Further, this measure is less likely to suffer a bias due to false 
reports. For example, a falsely reported stolen gun case can be corrected later by the police 
agency if an individual mistakenly reports that his/her gun is stolen. 
Lawst in equation (2.5) is an indicator for a shall-issue law and Post-Passage Trendst is a 
time trend that counts the number of years since the enactment of a shall-issue law in state s in 
year t. For the states that passed a shall-issue law earlier than 1970 and their counterparts which 
never passed a shall-issue law, this variable takes the value of zero. The vector Xst includes 
control variables such as the larceny rate, unemployment rate, per capita real personal income, 
unemployment insurance, income maintenance and retirement payments, lagged incarceration 
rate, population density and the share of white and black males aged 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 in 
the total state population. The summary statistics of these variables are in Table 2.15. Also 
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 Including the data obtained from agencies that reported less than 12 months do not affect the results presented in 
this paper. 
48
 Population covered by the agency may not be same as the total state population. However, for most of the cases 
the agencies that reported a full 12 months cover a quite large share of the population. For example, in 2006, the 
total population covered by such agencies was over 200 million which makes up about 65% of the US population. 
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included in the equation (2.5) are state fixed effects, year dummies together with linear state 
trends. 
The main source of the state-level data is Ayres and Donohue (2009).
49
 Some of these 
variables (at the county level) are also used by Lott and Mustard (1997). The authors used this 
data set to test whether a shall-issue law is associated with an increase in the crime rate of a state. 
This data set provides, broadly, variables that measure economic conditions, criminal activity 
and demographic characteristics of states. Table 2.15 provides the summary statistics. The 
economic condition variables are the Unemployment Rate, and four per capita income variables; 
namely Personal Income, Unemployment Benefits, Income Maintenance and Retirement 
Payments. Other control variables include Larceny Rate and Incarceration Rate. Finally, the 
variables that proxy the demographic characteristics of a state are the Population Density and the 
share of black and white males aged 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 in the total state population (% 
Black Male Population 10-19, % Black Male Population 20-29, % Black Male Population 30-39,  
% White Male Population 10-19, % White Male Population 20-29, % White Male Population 30-
39). 
  The variables Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst in equation (2.5) are intended to capture 
the increase in the availability of guns to potential criminals. However, Lott and Mustard (1997) 
have demonstrated that when a shall-issue law is enacted, criminals switch to crimes that require 
less contact with the victims. Specifically, they argue that when a shall-issue law is enacted, the 
number of thefts increases, while the number of murders, rapes and robberies decreases. Further, 
guns are one of the most commonly stolen items in thefts. Therefore, there may be a mechanical 
relationship between shall-issue laws and amount of stolen gun cases through number of thefts. 
Consequently, if the larceny rate is not controlled for in equation (2.5), the variables that measure 
the state‟s status of shall-issue laws (Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst) proxy for both the increase 
in the availability of guns to potential criminals through theft and (possible) increase in number 
of larceny cases due to shall-issue laws. In other words, estimating equation (2.5) without the 
larceny rate provides the total effect of shall-issue laws on stolen gun cases which incorporates 
both its direct effect (increase in the availability of guns) and indirect effect (due to the (possible) 
increase in thefts after the passage of shall-issue laws). When the larceny rate is controlled for, 
the coefficients of Law and the Post-Passage Trend can be interpreted as the change in the 
amount of stolen guns per theft when a shall-issue law is enacted in a state.
50
 
 Specification in equation (2.5) (except the larceny rate) is similar to the ones employed 
by Ayres and Donohue (2009), Lott and Mustard (1997) and Moody and Marvell (2009). These 
researchers estimate the impact of shall-issue laws on seven felony crimes employing equation 
(2.5) in three different ways: (a) including the Lawst indicator alone, (b) including the Post-
Passage Trendst trend variable alone, and (c) including both Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst 
together. I follow the convention in estimation and provide the results for all three models. These 
models are estimated using OLS for the sample period 1978-2006.
51
 Except Lawst, Post-Passage 
Trendst, year dummies, state fixed effects and trends, all variables are in natural logarithms. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and regressions are weighted by state population 
covered by the police agencies. 
 




 Similar results are obtained when the burglary rate is included in equation (2.5) instead of the larceny rate. 
51
 1983 is out of the estimation sample. This is because the data set was not available at the source.  
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Table 2.13 Influence of Enactment of Shall-Issue Law on Probability of Carrying a 
Handgun in the Last Month 








 Marginal Effect is calculated for    
1 Whole sample 0.006*** -0.004 0.015** 
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) 
2 Individuals Over Minimum Age
a
  0.011***   
  (0.002)   
3 Individuals Under Minimum Age
b 
0.001   
  (0.002)   
4 Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,c 
 -0.012 0.035*** 
   (0.025) (0.013) 
5 Current Arrestees, Over Min. Age
a,d 
 0.001 0.016** 
   (0.011) (0.008) 
6 Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Age
b,c 
 -0.023* 0.011 
   (0.012) (0.008) 





(0.010)   
 Observations 58,217 10,762 16,322 
Notes to Table 2.13: Columns I, II and III present the average marginal effects of the variable Law based on 
estimation of equation (2.1) with the dependent variable Gun in Last Month on samples listed at the top. Law 
Abiding Individuals have not committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have 
committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have 
committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The 
first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal 






 Ever Arrested=0, 
d
 Ever Arrested=1 
The dependent variable, Gun in Last Month, is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual 
reported that he/she has carried a handgun at least once in the last 30 days. The marginal effects are obtained by 
calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun when the variable Law is 
changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
The estimates obtained from estimation of equation (2.5) are provided in Table 2.16. In 
the first three columns, only Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst are included in the regressions 
without any controls. None of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. The results in 
columns 4 to 6 pertain to the model where the measures of shall-issue status of the states and 
state fixed effects are included. The coefficients of both Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst are 
negative and significant, but controlling for year dummies and state trends removes the 
significance of Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst (columns 7 to 9). When the whole set of control 
variables but the larceny rate are included in equation (2.5) as covariates (columns 10 to 12), the 
sizes of the coefficients of Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst do not change and they remain 
insignificant. Controlling additionally for the larceny rate (columns 13 to 15) does not change the 
statistical significance of the Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst, either. They remain insignificant. 
These results hold regardless of the employed measure of shall-issue status of states (including 
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only Lawst dummy, only Post-Passage Trendst, or both). That is, shall-issue laws are unrelated to 
the per capita real value of guns stolen in a state.
52
 
Although more guns may become vulnerable to theft by potential criminals after the 
enactment of a shall-issue law in a state, the findings in this section provide evidence that there is 
no difference in the amount of stolen gun cases between shall-issue states versus non-shall-issue 
states. This supports the findings in the previous sections of this paper. It seems safe to argue that 






2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 Whether the Concealed Weapon Laws, specifically the shall-issue laws, increase or 
decrease crime is still debated. Employing state-level or county-level data sets, previous studies 
report conflicting findings. Studies that find a positive impact of shall-issue laws on crime 
suggest that crime-facilitating effect of these laws dominate the crime-reducing effect. On the 
other hand, studies that find a reduction in crime following the enactment of shall-issue laws 
justify their results by arguing that the crime-reducing effect is greater in magnitude than the 
crime-facilitating effect. The upshot is that the estimated net effect of shall-issue laws on crime 
reported by existing research is sensitive to model specification, particular data used, and 
econometric methods. 
This paper recognizes that the previous studies on shall-issue laws overlook the fact that 
neither the crime-facilitating nor the crime-reducing effect of shall-issue laws can emerge if 
individuals do not respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more frequently (first order 
effect). To investigate this question, this paper employs an individual-level data set and 
supplements it with an aggregate-level data set, and tests whether the first order effect of a shall-
issue law is actually realized. In other words, this paper investigates the most basic research 
question in this context: “Do individuals respond to the shall-issue laws by carrying handguns 
more often?” and “If they do so, what type of individuals respond?” The answers to these 
questions are critical since the mechanisms through which shall-issue laws can increase or 
decrease crime cannot be at work if individuals do not respond to these laws by carrying 
handguns more frequently in the first place. 
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 The coefficients of the other variables are available upon request. Briefly, those control variables are mostly 
insignificant except a few. For example, in the models that does not control for larceny rate, the coefficient of the 
lagged prisoner rate is about -0.30 and the coefficient of the unemployment rate is 0.34. Both are significant at 
conventional significance levels. However, inclusion of the larceny rate reduces the size of these coefficients (in 
absolute value) and eliminates their significance. Larceny rate is positively associated with the real value of guns 
stolen. This relationship is almost one-to-one. A one percent increase in the larceny rate is associated with about a 
one percent increase in the per capita real value of guns stolen. This is consistent with Cook, Molliconi and Cole 
(1995) who argued that cash and firearms are the most common types of assets stolen. 
53
 The most convenient way to acquire guns for individuals who are likely to commit serious crimes is to obtain 
them illegally. Such illegal options mainly include stealing a gun or obtaining it through underground channels. 
Guns traded through informal channels are more likely to be illegally obtained, possibly stolen guns, than legally 
purchased ones. However, as the results of this section suggest, a shall-issue law does not influence the number of 
gun thefts. If shall-issue laws do not have an influence on stolen gun cases, availability of guns to criminals through 
underground markets should not be affected, either. 
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Table 2.14 Influence of Satisfying Minimum Required Age on Probability of Carrying a 
Gun in the Last Month 
  I II III 







Marginal Effect is calculated for 
   
1 Whole sample 0.006*** -0.001 -0.011* 
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) 
2 Individuals In a Shall-Issue State
a 
0.010***   
  (0.003)   
3 Individuals In a Non-Shall-Issue State
b 
-0.001   
  (0.002)   
4 Eventual Arrestees in Shall-Issue State
a,c 
 0.001 -0.001 
   (0.020) (0.011) 
5 Current Arrestees in Shall-Issue State
a,d 
 -0.002 -0.010 
   (0.010) (0.009) 
6 Eventual Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue State
b,c 
 -0.005 -0.022** 
   (0.025) (0.010) 
7 Current Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue State
b,d 
 0.003 -0.014 
   (0.011) (0.008) 
 Observations 58,217 10,762 16,322 
Notes to Table 2.14: Columns I, II and III present the average marginal effects of the variable Adult based on 
estimation of equation (2.1) with the dependent variable Gun in Last Month on samples listed at the top. Law 
Abiding Individuals have not committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have 
committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have 
committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The 
first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal 






 Ever Arrested=0, 
d
 Ever Arrested=1 
The dependent variable, Gun in Last Month, is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual reported that 
he/she has carried a handgun at least once in the last 30 days. The marginal effects are obtained by calculating the 
average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun when the variable Adult is changed from 0 to 1 




  The findings in this paper indicate that individuals start carrying handguns more often 
when they become eligible, i.e. when their states pass shall-issue laws or when they satisfy the 
minimum required age in an already-shall-issue state. This increase in handgun carrying 
behavior is a result of changes in behavior of law abiding individuals and those who are likely to 
commit minor crimes, such as drug possession, public order offenses or traffic offenses. After 
the enactment of a shall-issue law, no change is observed in the handgun carrying activity of 
individuals who are likely to commit serious offenses, such as assaults, rapes, manslaughters or 
robberies. Further, the analysis at the state-level suggests that there is no systematic impact of 
shall-issue laws on the amount of guns stolen, one mechanism through which ineligible 
individuals can have access to guns. Enactment of a shall-issue law is unlikely to be associated 
with an increase in the availability of guns to potential criminals. Taken as a whole, these 
findings cast doubt on the presumed existence of the crime-facilitating effect of shall-issue laws. 
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Table 2.15 Summary Statistics of Variables used in State-Level Analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Stolen Guns 0.003 0.003 
Law 0.391  
Post-Passage Trend 1.983 4.297 
Unemployment Rate 5.740 1.891 
Per capita Personal Income $18,627 10,997 
Per capita Unemployment Benefits $76.60 58.55 
Per capita Income Maintenance $247.36 172.19 
Per capita Retirement Payments $2,265 1,509 
Larceny Rate 2,838 753 
Lagged Incarceration Rate 298 221 
Population Density 329 1241 
% Black Male Pop. 10-19 0.010 0.010 
% Black Male Pop. 20-29 0.009 0.009 
% Black Male Pop. 30-39 0.008 0.008 
% White Male Pop. 10-19 0.063 0.014 
% White Male Pop. 20-29 0.065 0.014 
% White Male Pop. 30-39 0.065 0.012 
  
  
The results in this paper provide no evidence for a positive influence of shall-issue laws 
on frequency of gun carrying for individuals who are likely to commit serious crimes. This could 
be a consequence of the criteria to grant a concealed weapon license imposed by the shall-issue 
laws. Specifically, the criteria only allow carrying handguns for individuals who have maintained 
a clean arrest record until turning old enough to satisfy the minimum age requirement, which 
ranges between 18 and 23 among states. The rationale for such a policy can be the high 
likelihood of individuals who have committed crimes early in their lives to involve in future 
criminal activity which is highly costly to the society.
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On the other hand, individuals who have maintained clean arrest records until satisfying 
the minimum age requirement are eligible to carry handguns. It is possible for such individuals to 
commit a crime in the future. However, the results of this paper, similar to the findings of the 
previous literature, indicate that even if they carry guns, those individuals who have not 
committed a crime earlier in their lives are less likely to commit violent crimes in the future 
compared to the individuals who have committed crimes previously. This difference in tendency 
to commit serious crimes in the future justifies the use of arrest records in determining an 
individual‟s eligibility.
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 Previous research demonstrates that the individuals who have committed crimes (and therefore have a high level 
of criminal human capital) early in their lives have difficulty in switching back to the legal sector, and thus 




Table 2.16 Impact of Shall-Issue Laws on Stolen Guns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Law 0.185  0.335 -0.662***  -0.394*** 
 (0.318)  (0.330) (0.094)  (0.099) 
Post-Passage Trend  0.001 -0.022*  -0.064*** -0.037*** 
  (0.023) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.008) 
State FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
State Trends No No No No No No 
Control Variables No No No No No No 
Larceny Rate No No No No No No 
Observations 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 
 
 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law -0.044  -0.067 -0.043  -0.051 -0.055  -0.065 
 (0.076)  (0.077) (0.079)  (0.080) (0.077)  (0.077) 
Post-Passage Trend  0.040 0.041  0.022 0.023  0.026 0.027 
  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.023) (0.023) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Larceny Rate No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 
Notes to Table 2.16: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real value of number of firearms stolen per 100,000 individuals. Control variables are 
the natural logarithms of the unemployment rate, per capita real personal income, unemployment insurance, income maintenance and retirement payments, 
lagged incarceration rate, population density and the share of white and black males aged 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 in the total state population. Standard errors are 





CHAPTER 3. UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The economics literature has suggested that criminal activity is primarily motivated by 
net relative benefits to illegal activities. First pointed out by Becker (1968), potential criminals 
weigh the costs and benefits of committing crime. Crime and labor markets are not mutually 
exclusive choices but they represent a continuum of legal and illegal income-generating 
competing activities (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005, Machin and Meghir 2004, Block and 
Heineke 1975, Erlich 1973). Individuals with potentially better current and future opportunities 
in the legal labor market are less likely to commit crime.  
One determinant of these opportunities in the labor market is the unemployment rate, 
which fluctuates over the business cycle. During a recession, when the unemployment rate goes 
up, employment chances in the legal labor market diminish. As long as the employment 
prospects of individuals are influenced by the legal labor market conditions, the changes in the 
unemployment rate will impact the crime rate which is an aggregation of individuals‟ criminal 
activities. During times of high unemployment, the relative benefit of working in the legal labor 
market for an individual decreases on the margin, increasing the crime rate in the country.  
Using data from one single country, several studies confirm that unemployment increases 
crime. For example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), 
Corman and Mocan (2005), and Lin (2008) used data from the U.S. to investigate the impact of 
unemployment on crime. Other researchers have examined the same question using non-U.S. 
data, such as Edmark (2005) and Oster and Agell (2007) with Swedish data, and Buonanno 
(2006) with Italian data.  
However, in an international context, the impact of unemployment on crime has not been 
studied extensively. Only Wolpin (1980) analyzed unemployment‟s influence on crime by using 
burglaries in Japan, U.K. and U.S.
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 There is only a handful of studies which investigate other 
aspects of crime using country-level data sets. For example, Lin (2007) investigated the 
relationship between democracy and crime. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000, 2002) 
analyzed the impact of income inequality on crime by analyzing only homicides and robberies. 
Miron (2001) show that drug prohibition policies are one of the main determinants of crime 
across countries. 
The primary reason for the paucity of research based on international data is the absence 
of comparable crime statistics across countries. Legal practices, such as definitions and recording 
methods of crimes differ across countries. Another reason for non-comparability is the fact that 
some crimes are underreported. Underreporting is a more serious issue for developing countries 
and especially for low-value property crimes, such as theft and for crimes carrying a social 
stigma for the victim, such as rape (Soares 2004). Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000, 
2002) dealt with this measurement problem by assuming a time-invariant form for the 
measurement error in crimes. In this paper, a similar approach is used to deal with potential 
underreporting. In addition, differences in legal practices across countries are accounted for. The 
crime data employed in this paper have the advantage of having consistent measures of crime 
across countries as explained in more detail below.  
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This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime by employing a uniformly 
collected international data set from European countries. In this international context, using the 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable has an additional advantage. Analyses based on 
city level or state level data may suffer from reverse causality as crime may impact the local 
unemployment rate (Cullen and Levitt 1999). However, variation in a country‟s crime rate is not 
expected to directly affect the unemployment rate of that specific country, reducing the concern 
of a bias. However, for other reasons such as measurement error and confounding factors, 
unemployment rate may be endogenous. Therefore, I also estimate IV models where the 
exchange rate movements, industrial accidents and earthquakes are used as instruments for the 
unemployment rate. Consistent with Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), I find that 2SLS and 
OLS estimates are not significantly different from each other. 
The overall unemployment rate may not be an appropriate measure to identify the 
marginal criminal. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008) suggest that employment 
conditions among population subgroups may drive the impact of unemployment on crime. In 
addition, Engelhardt (2010) suggests that duration of the unemployment is a significant 
determinant of criminal activity. To test these hypotheses, I decompose the overall 
unemployment rate into various components according to gender, education and the duration of 
the unemployment. The results provide evidence that unemployment of males, of the individuals 
with low education, and of the individuals who have been jobless for more than one year drive 
the influence of the overall unemployment rate on crime. 
 
 
3.2 Empirical Framework  
 
Following previous research, I estimate a crime equation that includes controls for 
deterrence, economic incentives, consumption goods associated with crime and other socio-
demographic controls (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001, and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard, 
2002). As described below, the empirical framework aims at isolating the influence of 
unemployment on crime through mechanism related to individuals‟ labor market opportunities. 
In the empirical analysis, homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, burglary and motor 
vehicle theft are analyzed. Due to the organization of the data at the source, theft includes all 
activities that involve stealing such as burglaries and motor vehicle thefts. In other words, theft 
measure in this paper is comparable to the FBI‟s total property crime measure. As the eighth 
outcome variable, I construct larceny by taking the difference between the theft rate and sum of 
the burglary and motor vehicle theft rates.  
The variable of interest is the unemployment rate. As explained in the introduction, in an 
individual level framework, participation in criminal activity is associated with the employment 
status of the individual. As long as the current and future employment prospects of individuals 
are influenced by the legal labor market opportunities in the country, the changes in the 
unemployment rate will affect the crime rate which is an aggregation of individuals‟ criminal 
activities. The relationship between unemployment and crime is expected to be stronger for 
thefts, burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts which involve pecuniary benefits.
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 However, as noted by Corman and Mocan (2000), there may be some impact of unemployment on violent crimes 
as well. This is because violent crimes and property crimes can take place together in one incident. For example, a 




There are mechanisms through which unemployment can influence crime other than 
labor market opportunities. One of these channels is the consumption of crime-related goods. For 
example, Ruhm (1995) has shown that alcohol consumption increases during expansions and 
decreases during recessions. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) argue that gun availability and 
drug use may also move pro-cyclically. In addition, the link between unemployment and crime 
may be driven by the availability of theft-worthy goods. Specifically, during a recession 
individuals‟ incomes decline and this possibly reduces the consumption of high-value-storing 
goods such as jewelry or consumer durables. The decrease in consumption of such wealth-
storing goods may decrease the expected returns to criminal activity and therefore, leads to 
reduction in crime rate. A third mechanism may work through income inequality. Mocan (1999) 
and the papers he cites find that increases in unemployment worsen the relative position of low-
income groups in the income distribution. Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
(2002) suggest that a higher degree of income inequality induces greater criminal activity.  
The first two of the mechanisms mentioned above are directly controlled for in this 
analysis. The influence of unemployment on crime is isolated from the impact of consumption of 
crime-related goods by controlling for alcohol consumption per capita and drug crime rate. In 
addition, control variables include GDP per capita as a proxy for pecuniary returns to criminal 
activity. A similar approach is taken by Witte (1980).  
Income inequality is not explicitly controlled for in my main analysis because the sample 
size would have been reduced to almost half if a measure of inequality such as the Gini 
coefficient was added as a control variable. However, for a smaller sample, I run regressions that 
additionally employ Gini as a covariate.
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 The results are almost identical to those that do not 
employ Gini.
58
 In order to conduct the empirical analysis with a larger sample, I do not employ 
the Gini coefficient in my empirical analysis. 
In addition to alcohol consumption per capita, drug crime rate and GDP per capita, 
control variables include lagged police rate, urbanization rate and the ratio of young to old 
people.
59
 I also control for country indicators and year dummies in the regressions. Police rate is 
lagged by one year to avoid a potential reverse causality problem (Corman and Mocan 2000, 
2005).  
The unit of observation in this paper is a country-year. Consequently, the estimation 
strategy, as described above, may suffer from omitted variables that are not conventionally 
considered by previous studies that use data from one country. For example, Lin (2007) shows 
that the level of democracy in a country can be a significant determinant of crime. If the regime 
type in a country also influences the employment opportunities in a country, then my estimation 
will be biased. Similarly, immigration may influence both crime and unemployment (Bianchi, 
Buonanno and Pinotti 2011). Although I do not control for such influences in my main 
regressions, in the Results section, I show that my estimation is robust to controlling for such 
possibly-confounding factors. 
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 For example, inclusion of the Gini coefficient reduces the sample size in my largest sample (theft rate) from 187 
to 95. The source of the Gini coefficient is World Bank‟s World Development Indicators. 
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 To do this analysis, I run the models that include and exclude Gini coefficient in the same samples to eliminate the 
influence of the reduction in sample size. Gini was always insignificant. Generally, the signs, magnitudes and 
significance of the coefficients of unemployment rate are unaffected by the inclusion of Gini. The only exception is 
theft. The coefficient of the unemployment rate turns significant when Gini is additionally controlled for in theft 
regressions. 
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 Ratio of young to old population is computed by dividing the number of people who are aged between 15 and 39 




Exogeneity of unemployment in a crime regression could be questionable. Previous 
literature provided mixed evidence on the exogeneity of the unemployment rate in this context. 
For example, with a state panel data set, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) have shown that 
there is not much difference between OLS and IV estimates of the unemployment rate in a crime 
equation, suggesting reverse causality is not a major issue with state level data. Lin (2008) and 
Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) have found that IV estimates of the unemployment rate are 
consistently larger than the OLS estimates.  
In this paper, reverse causality is not alarming since a panel of countries (more 
aggregated units of observation) is employed in the empirical analysis. This is because variations 
in the crime rate of a country in a given year are not expected to influence the unemployment 
rate of the country in that same year. Moreover, in the empirical analysis, I control for several 
country characteristics as well as country fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobservable 
variables. However, for other reasons such as measurement error and confounding factors, 
unemployment rate may be endogenous. Therefore, I also estimate instrumental variable models 
in which the unemployment rate is instrumented by the exchange rate, industrial accidents and 
earthquakes. Instrumental Variables section below provides a more detailed discussion of the 
instruments and the estimation.  
Lin (2008) and Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) suggested that unemployment of 
population sub-groups may be the driving force behind the impact of the overall unemployment 
rate on crime. To gauge the potentially differential impact on crime of the unemployment 
prevailing in different population groups in a country, several unemployment rate measures are 
constructed. Specifically, I decompose the overall unemployment rate into measures of female 
and male unemployment; unemployment of the low educated and high educated individuals. 
These measures are constructed by computing the ratios of the unemployed people in the 
specified sub-groups of the population to the total labor force. For example, labor force share of 
unemployed females (males) is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed females 
(males) by the total labor force. Similarly, labor force share of the unemployed with primary 
education (with high education) is the ratio of the number of unemployed individuals who have 
completed at most primary school (at least secondary school) to the total labor force. 
Notice that the sum of the labor force shares of the unemployed from population sub-
groups equals to the overall unemployment rate. Therefore, employing the overall 
unemployment rate in the specification restricts the coefficients of the labor force share variables 
to be equal to each other. For example, the unrestricted form depicted by equation (3.1) below 
would reduce to equation (3.2) under the restriction that the coefficients βm and βf are equal to βu.  
 
(3.1) Crime = (βm Unemployed Males + βf Unemployed Females) / Labor Force + Xγ + ε 
 
(3.2)  Crime = βu Unemployment Rate + Xγ + ε 
 
Similarly, labor force shares of the unemployed individuals with primary education and high 
education are used in the empirical analysis. 
The influence of unemployment on crime may also depend on its duration. An individual 
who has been unemployed for a longer time period is more likely to commit a crime. This is 
because, individuals who have been jobless for a longer time periods face a lower opportunity 
cost of committing crime. Along the lines of this idea, Engelhardt (2010) reports that reduction 




international data set, I decompose the overall unemployment rate according to the duration of 
the unemployment and gender, similar to education and gender decomposition of the 
unemployment rate described above. Specifically, the constructed variables measure the labor 







The crime and police officers data are obtained from two waves of European Sourcebook 
of Crime and Criminal Justice, covering the period between 1995 and 2003.
61
 The first wave of 
the European Sourcebook, which covers the period between 1990 and 1994, is not included in 
this analysis because police officers data are not available. Prosecutions and convictions are 
available in all three waves and they can be considered as measures of deterrence. However, they 




The data set used in this paper includes information from 33 countries. The list of the 
countries and the years covered for each country is presented in Table 3.1. Some of the European 
countries are excluded from the analysis due to missing data. However, the included countries 
can be claimed to represent an overall picture of Europe. As of 2009, three quarters of the 
Europeans lived in the 33 countries that are included in this study. Further, these countries 
account for production of about 74 percent of the total European GDP.
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Crime statistics obtained from the European Sourcebook are similar to those provided by 
the Uniform Crime Reports in US. Both sources present information about crime as measured by 
reported complaints to the police. Another similarity between the European Sourcebook and 
Uniform Crime Reports is the uniformity in what is counted as a crime. That is, crime definitions 
in both sources are consistent over time. This quality of European Sourcebook is unique among 
cross-country crime data sets.
64
  
For all crimes included in the European Sourcebook, a standard definition is used and the 
statistics follow this standard definition where possible. These definitions are provided in Table 
3.2. If a country‟s crime statistics deviate from the standard definition, the European Sourcebook 
provides information about what aspect of the standard definition is not met. For example, the 
standard definition of homicide is “intentionally killing of a person.” According to this 
definition, euthanasia should be included as homicide, since euthanasia involves killing a fetus 
intentionally. However, euthanasia is not considered a homicide by some countries and it is 
impossible for these countries to provide homicide data that include euthanasia cases. The 
European Sourcebook lists the countries that follow the standard definition and also those that do 
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 The long-term (short-term) unemployed individuals are those who are unemployed for at least one year (less than 
one year). 
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 Since I use lagged police rate in estimation, the effective sample period becomes 1996-2003. 
62
 In most of the European countries the police use discretion to decide whether to prosecute or not. For example, the 
criminal can get away with a warning for small scale thefts or burglaries. Most importantly, the crime definitions 
used by the judicial system and the police are not identical. Although offence definitions adopted by the various 
police systems present uniformity among countries, rules for recording punishments can vary substantially.   
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 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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 For example, the United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems provide 
data reported by law enforcement agencies in each country. The crime statistics in the U.N. dataset are not standard 




not follow. The countries that deviate from the standard crime definitions and the way they 
deviate from the standard definitions are listed in Table 3.3. In the empirical analysis, any non-
conformity to definitions is controlled for by a set of dummy variables. 
The source of labor market variables, GDP per capita and urban population is the World 
Development Indicators.
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 The ratio of young population to the old population is the ratio of 
population aged 15-39 to the population aged 40 or more. It is constructed using the data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau's International database.
66
 Alcohol consumption per capita variable is   
obtained from the World Health Organization‟s Global Alcohol Database.
67
 Drug crime rate and 
the police rate are crimes related to drugs and police officers per 100,000 individuals, 
respectively. They are obtained from the European Sourcebook. Table 3.4 presents the 
definitions and the descriptive statistics of all the variables as well as their sources. 
Among the instrumental variables, exchange rate is obtained from the Penn World Tables 
version 6.3. Exchange rate is measured as the amount of domestic currency that one US dollar 
can buy. Share of manufacturing sector‟s value added in GDP is obtained from World 
Development Indicators. Finally, the data on industrial accidents and earthquakes are obtained 
from EM-DAT data base (the international disaster data base).
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. More details about the 






3.4.1 Overall Unemployment Rate 
 
Figure 1 provides a visual analysis of the influence of the unemployment rate on crime. 
In Figure 1, a measure of theft rate and the unemployment rate for the set of the countries with 
non-missing data are depicted. Theft rate is chosen because as defined in this paper, thefts 
include all property crimes, such as burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts. As a result, 
thefts in this paper correspond to FBI‟s total property crimes. The graphs of individual crime 
types are similar to that of theft.  The solid line represents the variation in the theft rate that is 
unexplained by the control variables. Specifically, the measure of the theft rate depicted in 
Figure 1 is obtained by calculating the residuals from the regression of theft rate on control 
variables.
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 The dashed line is the unemployment rate.  
Among the graphs of the 16 countries presented in Figure 1, most graphs show that the 
unemployment rate and the theft rate have very similar trends. Graphs of seven countries (UK, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Italy, Hungary and Finland) display an obvious positive 
correlation between the unemployment rate and the theft rate for the whole sample period.
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Another 6 graphs (Slovenia, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark, Czech Republic and Croatia) reveal 
positive correlation for some years in the sample.  








 http://www.emdat.be/  
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 The control variables are Lagged Police Rate, GDP per capita, % Urban Population, Drug Rate, Young per Old 
population and Alcohol consumption per capita as well as country fixed effects, year dummies and indicators that 
account for the differences in crime definitions. 
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Table 3.1 Countries Covered in the Study 
Country Years covered 
Albania 2001 
Austria 1996 - 2003 
Belgium 2000, 2003 
Croatia 1996 - 2003 
Cyprus 1999 - 2003 
Czech Republic 1996 - 2003 
Denmark 1996 - 2003 
Estonia 1996 - 2001, 2003 
Finland 1996 - 2003 
France 1997, 2001, 2003 
Georgia 1998 - 2003 
Greece 1996 - 2003 
Hungary 1996 - 2003 
Iceland 2003 
Ireland 1996 - 2003 
Italy 1996 - 2003 
Latvia 1996 - 1999 
Lithuania 1996 - 2003 
Luxembourg 2003 
Malta 2000, 2001 
Moldova 1999, 2000 
Netherlands 1998 - 2003 
Norway 1996 - 1999 
Poland 1996 - 2003 
Portugal 1996 - 2003 
Romania 1996 - 1999, 2001 - 2003 
Russia 2001 
Slovakia 2001 - 2003 
Slovenia 1996 - 2003 
Sweden 1996 - 2003 
Switzerland 1996 - 2003 
Turkey 1996 - 1999 
UK: England & Wales 1996 - 2003 
 
 
To quantify the relationship between unemployment and crime observed in Figure 1, I 
regress the crime rates on the unemployment rate and the control variables using OLS. The 
crimes considered are homicide, assault, rape, robbery, total theft, burglary, larceny and motor 
vehicle theft.
71
 The variable of interest in this section is the unemployment rate. Control 
variables include lagged police rate, GDP per capita, % urban population, drug rate, young per 
old population and alcohol consumption per capita. The regressions also control for country 
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fixed effects and year dummies as well as indicators that account for the differences in crime 
definitions. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. 
Regressions are weighted by the country population.
72
 The results are provided in Table 3.5. 
Being unemployed can induce motivation to earn income illegally, but it does not 
necessarily increase violent behavior. The estimates in Table 3.5 support this hypothesis. The 
sign of the unemployment rate‟s coefficients are positive for all crimes that involve pecuniary 
benefits except robbery. Further, this influence is statistically significant for total thefts, larcenies 
and motor vehicle thefts. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated 
with 2%, 1% and 4% increase in total thefts, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts, respectively.
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These results are consistent with previous studies that employ US data, such as Lin (2008), 
Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) and Levitt (2004). The unemployment rate is not 
significantly associated violent crimes. The negative sign of the unemployment rate in violent 
crime regressions is not uncommon in the literature. For example, OLS estimates in Lin (2008) 
show the same exact pattern. 
GDP per capita is positively associated with property crimes but not with violent crimes. 
This may be because GDP per capita is a proxy for the benefits associated with crimes. The 
greater is the average income in a country, the greater returns to committing property crimes are 
on average. Along the similar lines, the coefficient of Young per Old for crimes that involve 
monetary benefits is negative. This variable may be indicative of wealth in a country. Generally 
wealth is accumulated over the life cycle and the elderly have more valuable assets compared to 
the young. If in a country there are more young individuals for each elderly individual, then there 
is less to steal.
74
  
The coefficient of Drug Crime Rate is consistently positive for violent crimes and 
negative for property crimes.
75
 This pattern may arise because drug crimes can be substitutes for 
theft, burglary and motor vehicle theft, but complements for violent crimes. Individuals who 
choose to work in illegal sector allocate their time between several illegal income-generating 
activities. The criminals whose net returns to drug crimes are greater than net returns to theft, 
burglary or vehicle theft are less likely to commit theft, burglary or motor vehicle theft. They 
rather earn income through drugs. 
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 The country population that is used for weighting is the average for the sample period. 
73
 Similar elasticities are estimated when natural log of the crimes are used instead of the level of the crime. When 
standard errors are corrected for first-order serial correlation, the coefficients of the unemployment rate in theft, 
larceny and motor vehicle theft regressions are significant at conventional levels and the estimated elasticities are 
similar to those reported in Table 3.5. 
74
 On the other hand, it is well-known that the young are more likely to commit crimes compared to the old. In fact, 
this is reflected in the positive coefficient of Young per Old in the Assault regression.  The greater the ratio of young 
individuals to old individuals is, the greater the number of assaults which has no monetary rewards to the offender. 
75
 The Drug Crime Rate is not only a proxy for the prevalence of drug use and possession, but also a measure of the 




Table 3.2 Standard Definitions of Crimes in the European Sourcebook 
Crime Definition 
  
Homicide Intentional killing of a person. It includes assault leading to death, euthanasia and infanticide, excludes 
assistance with suicide. 
Assault Inflicting bodily injury on another person with intent. It excludes assault leading to death, threats, acts just 
causing pain, slapping/punching, sexual assault. 
Rape Sexual intercourse with a person against her/his will (per vaginam or other). Where possible, the figures 
include other than vaginal penetration (e.g. buggery), violent intra-marital intercourse,  sexual intercourse 
without force, with a helpless person, sexual intercourse with force with a minor, incestual sexual intercourse, 
with or without force with a minor. But it excludes sexual intercourse with a minor without force and other 
forms of sexual assault. 
Robbery Stealing from a person with force or threat of force. Where possible, the figures include muggings (bag-
snatching), theft with violence. But they exclude pick-pocketing, extortion and blackmail. 
Theft Depriving a person/organization of property without force with the intent to keep it. Where possible, the 
figures include burglary, theft of motor vehicles, theft of other items, theft of small value. But they exclude 
embezzlement, receiving/handling of stolen goods. 
Burglary Gaining access to a closed part of a building or other premises by use of force with the intent to steal goods. 
Figures on burglary should, where possible, include theft from a factory, shop or office, from a military 
establishment, or by using false keys; they should exclude, however, theft from a car, from a container, from a 
vending machine, from a parking meter and from a fenced meadow/compound. 
Motor Vehicle Theft According to the standard definition, figures on theft of a motor vehicle should, where possible, include 








Table 3.3 Countries that Deviate from the Standard Crime Definitions 
Offense Deviation from the definition Countries – 2
nd
 wave Countries – 3
rd
 wave 
Homicide Assault leading to death 
excluded  
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, 
Slovenia. 
Albania, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Moldova, The Netherlands, Russia, 
Slovenia. 
Homicide Euthanasia excluded  Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Malta, Russia, Slovenia. 
Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Malta, 
Slovenia. 
Homicide Infanticide excluded Czech Republic, Greece, Norway, Romania. Czech Republic, Greece, Romania. 
Homicide Assistance with suicide 
included 
Austria, Latvia, Norway, Slovakia, 
Switzerland. 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Malta, Switzerland. 
Assault Assault leading to death 
included  
Belgium, Czech Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia, 
Georgia, Greece,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Malta,  
Moldova, Norway,  Romania,  Russia,  
Slovenia. 
Albania, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, 
Hungary, Malta, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Russia, Slovenia. 
Assault Threats included  Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, 
UK. 
Georgia, Ireland, Malta. 
Assault Acts causing pain included  Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, 
Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, Turkey, UK. 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, UK.  




Table 3.3 continued 
Offense Deviation from the definition Countries – 2
nd
 wave Countries – 3
rd
 wave 
Assault Sexual assault included  Georgia, Ireland, Malta, Norway. Croatia. 
Rape Acts other than vaginal 
penetration excluded 
Latvia, Romania, Russia. Denmark, Georgia, Greece, Russia, 
UK. 
Rape Violent intra-marital 
intercourse excluded 
Greece, Romania, Russia. Greece, Moldova, Russia. 
Rape Sexual intercourse without 
force with a helpless person 
excluded 
Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden. 
Denmark, Georgia, Greece, 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden. 
Rape Sexual intercourse with force 
with a minor excluded 
-- Georgia, Greece, Slovenia. 
Rape Incestual sexual intercourse 
with or without force with a 
minor excluded 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, UK. 
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
UK. 
Rape Sexual intercourse with a 
minor without force included 
Albania, Belgium, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia 
Albania, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Malta, Moldova, Portugal. 
Rape Other forms of sexual assault 
included 
Czech Republic, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania. 
Romania. 
Robbery Extortion and blackmail 
included 
Cyprus. -- 




Table 3.3 continued 
Offense Deviation from the definition Countries – 2
nd
 wave Countries – 3
rd
 wave 
Robbery Pick-pocketing included Turkey. Moldova, Netherlands. 
Robbery Muggings excluded Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, 
Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden. 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden. 
Robbery Theft with violence excluded Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, 
Norway. 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, ,  
Theft Burglary excluded Cyprus, Norway. -- 
Theft Theft of motor vehicles 
excluded 
Denmark. Denmark, Moldova. 
Theft Theft of small values 
excluded 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, , Switzerland. 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia. 
Theft Receiving/handling stolen 
property included  
UK. -- 
Theft Embezzlement included -- Albania, Cyprus, Greece, Moldova. 
Burglary Burglary from a factory, 
shop, or office excluded 
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway. Italy. 
Burglary Burglary from a military 
establishment excluded  
Georgia, Italy, Luxembourg and Norway. Albania, , Georgia, Greece, Italy, 
Slovenia 




Table 3.3 continued 
Offense Deviation from the definition Countries – 2
nd
 wave Countries – 3
rd
 wave 
Burglary Theft (burglary) by gaining 
entrance with false keys 
excluded 
Georgia, Norway, Switzerland. Greece, Switzerland 
Burglary Theft from a car included Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey. 
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Iceland, Malta, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovenia. 
Burglary Theft from a container 
included 
Albania, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, 
Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey. 
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland. 
Burglary Stealing from vending 
machine included 
Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland. 
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Malta, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland. 
Burglary Theft from a parking meter 
included 
Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland. 
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland. 




Table 3.3 continued 
Offense Deviation from the definition Countries – 2
nd
 wave Countries – 3
rd
 wave 
Burglary Theft from a fenced meadow 
or compound included 
Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Russia. 
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Moldova, 





Joyriding excluded Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Netherlands, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia. 
Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece, 





Theft of motorboats included  Cyprus, Finland, France, Georgia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, UK. 





motor vehicles included  





Table 3.4 Summary Statistics and Descriptions 
Variable Definition Source N Mean Std. Dev. 
Homicide Rate
*
 Homicides per 100,000 individuals. A 169 5.28 3.94 
Assault Rate
*
 Assaults per 100,000 individuals. A 187 185.83 239.54 
Rape Rate
*
 Rapes per 100,000 individuals. A 187 8.01 6.41 
Robbery Rate
*
 Robberies per 100,000 individuals. A 187 73.74 67.75 
Theft Rate
*
 Thefts per 100,000 individuals. A 187 2618.52 1991.86 
Burglary Rate
*
 Burglaries per 100,000 individuals. A 160 938.69 681.00 
Larceny Rate Difference between the Theft Rate and the sum of 
Burglary Rate and Motor Vehicle Theft Rate. 
A 153 1668.26 1339.17 
Motor Vehicle Theft
*
 Thefts of motor vehicles per 100,000 individuals. A 179 275.10 238.89 
Unemployment Rate Ratio of unemployed population to labor force times 100. B 187 8.52 4.25 
Share of Unemployed Males in 
Labor Force 
Ratio of unemployed male population to total labor force 
times 100. 
B 187 4.48 2.27 
Share of Unemployed Females in 
Labor Force 
Ratio of unemployed female population total labor force 
times 100. 
B 187 4.04 2.11 
Share of the Poorly-Educated 
and Unemployed in Labor Force 
Ratio of unemployed population with at most primary 
schooling to total labor force times 100. 
B 172 2.67 1.58 
Share of the Well-Educated and 
Unemployed in Labor Force 
Ratio of unemployed population with more than primary 
schooling to total labor force times 100. 
B 171 5.71 3.67 
Share of the Poorly-Educated 
and Unemployed Males in Labor 
Force 
Ratio of unemployed male population with at most 
primary schooling to total labor force times 100. 
B 172 1.47 0.93 




Table 3.4 continued 
Variable Definition Source N Mean Std. Dev. 
Share of the Poorly-Educated 
and Unemployed Females in 
Labor Force 
Ratio of unemployed female population with at most 
primary schooling to total labor force times 100. 
B 172 1.19 0.74 
Share of the Well-Educated and 
Unemployed Males in Labor 
Force 
Ratio of unemployed male population with more than 
primary schooling to total labor force times 100. 
B 171 2.91 1.97 
Share of the Well-Educated and 
Unemployed Females in Labor 
Force 
Ratio of unemployed female population with more than 
primary schooling to total labor force times 100. 
B 171 2.80 1.78 
Share of Short-term Unemployed 
Males in Labor Force 
Ratio of males who are unemployed for less than one year 
to total labor force times 100. 
B 154 2.38 1.02 
Share of Short-term Unemployed 
Females in Labor Force 
Ratio of females who are unemployed for less than one 
year to total labor force times 100. 
B 154 2.16 0.94 
Share of Short-term Unemployed 
Males in Labor Force 
Ratio of males who are unemployed for more than one 
year to total labor force times 100. 
B 154 1.89 1.35 
Share of Short-term Unemployed 
Females in Labor Force 
Ratio of females who are unemployed for more than one 
year to total labor force times 100. 
B 154 1.74 1.34 
Lagged Police Rate Total number of police officers per 100,000 people A 187 349.21 168.69 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in 2000 dollars. Scaled by 0.01. B 187 207.47 105.81 
% Urban Population Ratio of the population living in urban areas to the total 
population times 100. 
B 187 67.25 12.81 
Drug Rate Crimes related to drugs per 100,000 individuals. A 187 145.55 180.67 
Alcohol Alcohol consumption per capita per annum, in liters. C 187 9.69 3.09 
Young/Old Ratio of population aged 15-39 to the population aged 
more than 40 times 100. 
D 187 83.09 9.80 




Table 3.4 continued 
Variable Definition Source N Mean Std. Dev. 
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1 Exchange rate weighted with the share of manufacturing 
sector‟s value added to GDP 
F, B 175 372.83 1155.74 
Industrial Accidents × Manuf. 
GDPt-1 
Dummy for industrial accidents weighted with the share of 
manufacturing sector‟s value added to GDP 
E,B 175 1.60 5.65 
Earthquake Dummy for earthquakes E 187 0.09 0.29 
Notes to Table 3.4: 
*
 See Table 3.2 for the standard definitions of crimes and the Table 3.3 for the deviations of the countries from the standard definition  
A – European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice, B – World Development Indicators, C – World Health Organization, Global Alcohol Database,  




A similar pattern is observed for the coefficient of the Alcohol consumption. Alcohol 
consumption per capita is correlated positively with violent crimes and negatively with property 
crimes. A possible explanation of this pattern involves the impact of alcohol on individual 
behavior. First, excessive alcohol consumption is associated with more aggressive and violent 
behavior (Markowitz 2005). Secondly, individuals who consume large amounts of alcohol may 
suffer from judgment impairment and diminished physical performance. These and other 
mechanisms that relate alcohol consumption and criminal activity are discussed in Carpenter and 
Dobkin (2010). The side effects of alcohol consumption are reflected in the estimated 
coefficients of alcohol. Potential criminals under the influence of alcohol are less likely to 
effectively carry out activities related to property crimes. In fact, several property crimes require 
some skills such as opening a locked door (in case of a burglary) or starting a car without keys 
(in case of motor vehicle theft). 
Although most of variables‟ coefficients exhibit the expected signs, police rate and 
urbanization rate do not. Nevertheless, those variables are not the variables of interest. Notice 
that these control variables are included in the regressions to isolate the influence of the 
unemployment rate on crime through mechanisms other than legal labor market opportunities. 
The reason for the unexpected coefficient signs may be due to imprecise estimation as these 




The sample I employ contains countries with both stable and unstable democracies. 
Using a country-level data set, Lin (2007) shows the level of democracy in a country is a 
significant determinant of crime. If the regime type in a country also influences the 
unemployment rate, then my estimation will be biased. Further, the influence of unemployment 
rate on crime may be different in democratic versus less democratic countries.77 To investigate 
these possibilities, I obtained the Democracy index of the countries in my sample from Polity 
IV.78 The Democracy index ranges between -10 (strongly autocratic) and 10 (strongly 
democratic). European countries in my sample were mostly strongly democratic countries with 
median Democracy level of 10. I construct an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a 
country‟s average democracy level during the years covered is equal to 10. 18 countries‟ average 
democracy levels are 10 the sample.79 In addition to all of the control variables mentioned 
above, I included the democratic country indicator and its interaction with the unemployment 
rate in the regressions. The coefficients of the unemployment rate variable remain unaffected, 
while the interaction term is insignificant. The sum of the interaction term and the 
unemployment rate is also positive and significant at conventional levels. These results indicate 
that there is no systematic difference between the strongly democratic and less democratic 
countries in terms of the influence of the unemployment rate on crime. In other words, findings 
reported in this section are not driven by the countries with stable democracies. 
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 Similarly, some previous studies had positive coefficients for police in crime regressions. Examples include 
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994). 
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 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 





Figure 3.1 Thefts and the Unemployment Rate 
Solid line represents the residuals from the regression where the theft rate is regressed on all control variables except the unemployment rate (police rate, GDP 
per capita, alcohol consumption, drug rate, % urban population, young per old population country fixed effects, year dummies and indicators that account for 
differences in crime definitions). Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. Dashed line is the unemployment rate. Only graphs for 
the countries that have data for the whole sample period (1996-2003) are presented.
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Table 3.5 Crime and Overall Unemployment Rate 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Homicide Assault Rape Robbery Theft Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft 
Unemployment Rate -0.02 -4.86 -0.25* -0.85 43.10*** 6.01 21.07** 11.17*** 
 
(0.03) (4.05) (0.14) (1.68) (14.26) (7.75) (8.60) (2.90) 
Police Rate (t-1) 0.00*** 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.73 0.50 2.57 0.18 
 
(0.00) (0.21) (0.01) (0.04) (0.61) (1.21) (1.80) (0.11) 
GDP per cap. -0.01 1.77 -0.04 -0.31 7.44** 0.23 4.28** 1.75 
 
(0.01) (1.91) (0.08) (0.81) (2.98) (2.35) (1.95) (1.03) 
% Urban Pop. 0.15** -10.25 -0.84* 6.88* 15.63 -5.95 5.21 -7.74 
 
(0.06) (25.61) (0.48) (3.57) (30.84) (14.52) (19.80) (10.57) 
Drug Rate 0.00 1.01*** 0.00 0.03 -1.30* -1.00*** -0.00 -0.57*** 
 
(0.00) (0.31) (0.01) (0.06) (0.73) (0.33) (0.38) (0.15) 
Young/Old -0.06 23.16* 0.04 -3.02 -42.90** -17.52 -35.91*** -1.86 
 
(0.04) (12.55) (0.26) (3.24) (20.08) (10.49) (12.62) (6.02) 
Alcohol 0.12 35.11 0.68 2.28 -14.93 -25.90 -0.65 -9.25 
 
(0.08) (24.29) (0.52) (3.36) (44.62) (16.47) (27.18) (14.86) 
N 169 187 187 187 187 160 153 179 
F test for fixed effects 10,344 2,152 12,218 676 861 88 843 265 
P value for fixed effects 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes to Table 3.5: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All models 
include country fixed effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. Standard errors that are clustered at the country 
level are presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
F test for fixed effects and P value for fixed effects rows provide the F statistic and p value for the joint significance of country fixed effects and year dummies, 
respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime 




Many mechanisms can motivate a positive influence of migration on crime. For example, 
migrants are more likely to be poorly-educated and to be discriminated against. Customers may 
reveal distaste against migrants. Alternatively, migrants may be less productive in some 
industries. All of these mechanisms may cause migrants to have less lucrative labor market 
opportunities and consequently lead them to involve in criminal activity. As a result, exclusion of 
a measure of migration may result in biased estimates if migration influences both 
unemployment and crime.
80
 To prevent against this possibility, I include the share of migrants in 
country population in the regressions. The results are virtually unchanged. Despite a slight 
decrease, the magnitude and significance of the unemployment rate remain almost identical to 
Table 3.5 for property crimes. The share of migrants does not significantly influence any crime 






3.4.2 Unemployment of Population Sub-Groups  
 
As discussed in the introduction and empirical framework sections and by Gould, 
Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008), overall 
unemployment rate may not be able to identify the marginal criminal. Individuals who belong to 
two different population sub-groups (such as the highly-educated versus poorly-educated or 
males versus females) and who are financially at the margin of committing a crime may respond 
differently when they become unemployed. For example, Freeman (1995), Grogger (1998), and 
LaGrange, Teresa and Silverman (1999) argued that males are more likely to commit a crime 
than do females. Similarly, Becker and Mulligan (1997), Lochner (2004), and Lochner and 
Moretti (2004) have suggested that greater schooling decreases criminal activity. Furthermore, 
Grogger (1998) and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) report that unskilled and uneducated 
males respond to changes in their employment statuses most significantly by committing crimes.  
 
 
3.4.2.1 Gender-Specific Unemployment 
 
In this section, I investigate whether the influence of male unemployment on crime is 
different from that of female unemployment. The overall unemployment rate is decomposed into 
measures of gender-specific unemployment as described in the empirical framework section. 
Specifically, instead of the overall unemployment rate, labor force shares of the unemployed 
males and females are included in regressions.
82
 Notice that these labor force shares add up to 
the overall unemployment rate. In the upper panel of Table 3.6, results for total theft, burglary, 
larceny and motor vehicle theft are summarized.
83
 Although only the coefficients of the measures 
of gender-specific unemployment are provided, the control variables included in the models are 
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 I thank another anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
81
 The coefficient of migrants share is negative but insignificant for other property crimes. This result may be due to 
migrants‟ poverty. Migrants are associated with low levels of income and wealth. After all, poverty may be one 
reason why they migrate to another country. Therefore, an increase in the share of migrants in a country implies 
fewer pecuniary benefits of committing a crime on average. 
82
 Labor force share of unemployed males (females) is calculated as the ratio of unemployed males (females) to the 
total labor force. 
83




same as those in Table 3.5. The signs and significance of these control variables are similar to 
those in the model with the overall unemployment rate (Table 3.5). The regressions are weighted 
by the country population and standard errors are clustered at the country-level. For comparison 
purposes, the lower panel includes the estimates from the specification where the overall 
unemployment rate is included instead of labor force shares of unemployed males and females.  
As shown in Table 3.6, when labor force shares of unemployed both males and females 
are included jointly instead of the overall unemployment rate, their coefficients turn insignificant 
or become significant at a lower level. This result is not surprising, as male and female 
unemployment rates are highly correlated with each other (0.85). However, the comparison of 
the magnitudes of the coefficients reveals that male unemployment is more dominant for 
property crimes compared to female unemployment. The coefficients of male unemployment are 
significantly greater than coefficients of the female unemployment with p-values less than 0.05. 
The results obtained from burglaries are interesting. Conditional on female 
unemployment, an increase in the male unemployment is associated with an increase in the 
burglary rate. On the other hand, keeping the male unemployment rate constant, the female 
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with burglary rate. This systematic difference may be 
due to difference in the behavior of unemployed males and females. If an unemployed female is 
more likely to stay at home than an unemployed male, then increase in female unemployment 





3.4.2.2 Education-Specific Unemployment  
 
The overall unemployment rate is decomposed into education-specific unemployment 
measures. This allows me to gauge the differential impacts on crime of the unemployment of 
individuals with higher and lower levels of education. Specifically, instead of the overall 
unemployment rate, the shares of the unemployed people with primary education and higher 
education in the labor force are included in regressions.
85
 Since individuals with primary 
education have worse labor market prospects than high educated individuals, the relationship 
between crime and the unemployment of individuals with primary education is expected to be 
stronger. 
Table 3.7 displays the results. In the upper panel, results for total theft, burglary, larceny 
and motor vehicle theft are summarized. For comparison purposes, the lower panel presents the 
estimates from the specification where the overall unemployment rate is included instead of the 
labor force share variables. The sample sizes in these regressions are smaller due to missing 
education-specific unemployment data. Consequently, in Table 3.7, the coefficients estimates of 
the overall unemployment rate are different from those reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
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 This is because burglarizing a house when the residents are inside is costlier for a potential criminal. 
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 Labor force share of the unemployed with primary education (high education) is the ratio of the unemployed 





Table 3.6 Crime and Gender-Specific Unemployment 
 Theft Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft 
Unemployed Males in Labor Force 121.63 83.40** 68.82 30.12* 
 (80.30) (38.26) (67.50) (14.96) 
     Unemployed Females in Labor Force -52.44 -85.37** -34.03 -11.95 
 (83.70) (37.89) (71.84) (18.69) 
 
    Overall Unemployment Rate 43.10*** 6.01 21.07** 11.17*** 
 (14.26) (7.75) (8.60) (2.90) 
 
    Observations 187 160 153 179 
Notes to Table 3.6: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, 
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed 
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents 
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of unemployed males and females. For 
comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the estimates of the overall unemployment rate instead of the labor 
force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are presented in parentheses. 
The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the 
descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences across countries, respectively. 
 
 
Results presented in Table 3.7 provide evidence that unemployed individuals with 
primary education are the driving force behind the influence of the unemployment rate on crime. 
A one percentage point increase in the labor force share of the unemployed with low education 
leads to about 7% and 16% increase in total thefts and motor vehicle thefts, conditional on the 
unemployment of the high educated individuals.
86
 The influence of the labor force share of the 
unemployed with low education is greater than that of the unemployed with high education in 






3.4.2.3 Gender-and-Education-Specific Unemployment 
 
In this section, the estimated specification is modified to include unemployment measures 
of males and females with primary and higher education instead of the overall unemployment 
rate. That is, four unemployment variables are included in the regressions instead of the overall 
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 These elasticity estimates are consistent with the estimates of the overall unemployment rate. For example, a one 
percentage point increase in the overall unemployment rate is associated with two percent increase in the total theft 
rate. In this sample, on average, one third of the all unemployed individuals have at most primary education. If 
individuals with low education and high education are equally likely to be laid off for example due to a recession, a 
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a one third percentage point increase in the 
unemployment of individuals with primary education. According to the estimates in Table 3.7, such a change will 
lead to a two percent increase in the total theft rate (six percent multiplied by one third). 
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 However, the impact of education specific unemployment on violent crimes is statistically not different than zero 








Table 3.8 presents the results. In the upper panel, results for total theft, burglary, larceny 
and motor vehicle theft are summarized. For comparison purposes, in the lower panel, the 
estimates from the specification where the overall unemployment rate is included are presented. 
The sample sizes in these regressions are smaller due to missing education-specific 
unemployment data. Consequently, in Table 3.8, the coefficients estimates of the overall 
unemployment rate are different from those reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
The results in Table 3.8 are very similar to the findings in the previous sections. The 
coefficients of unemployment of males with primary education are significant and positive for 
total thefts and motor vehicle thefts, but not for burglaries and larcenies. This may be due to 
either smaller sample sizes or the high correlation of the unemployment of males and females in 
the same education group.
89
 The unemployment of males with primary education is positively 
associated with other property crimes as well. Within the education categories, the coefficients of 
the labor force share of the unemployed males are greater than that of females. In addition, 
within gender categories, the coefficients of the labor force share of the unemployed individuals 
with primary education are greater than that of individuals with high education. 
 
3.4.3 Duration of the Unemployment  
 
This section investigates whether the length of the unemployment spell is a significant 
determinant of the influence of unemployment on crime. Specifically, I investigate whether the 
individuals who are long-term unemployed (more than one year) or short-term unemployed 
drives the relationship between crime and the overall unemployment rate. Individuals who are 
unemployed for longer periods are expected to be more likely to commit crimes. 
To test this hypothesis, the overall unemployment rate is decomposed into labor force 
shares according to the duration of the unemployment. Specifically, I construct variables that 
measure the labor force shares of the long-term and short-term unemployed males and females. 




The results are presented in Table 3.9. In the upper panel, results for total theft, burglary, 
larceny and motor vehicle theft are summarized. For comparison purposes, in the lower panel, 
the estimates from the specification where the overall unemployment rate is included are 
presented. The sample sizes in these regressions are smaller due to missing unemployment 
duration data. Consequently, in Table 3.9, the coefficients estimates of the overall unemployment 
rate are different from those reported in previous tables. 
 
 
                                                          
88
 Labor force share of the unemployed males (females) with low education [high education] is the ratio of the 
number of unemployed males (females) with low education [high education] to the total labor force. 
89
 Correlations between males and females‟ unemployment are 0.71 for individuals with primary education and 0.92 
for individuals with high education. 
90
 There are four such components. The labor force share of the long term (short term) unemployed males [females] 
is calculated by the ratio of the number of males [females] who are unemployed for more than one year (less than 




Table 3.7 Crime and Education-Specific Unemployment 
 Theft Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft 
Unemployed with Primary Educ. in LF 214.67* 69.59 96.36 46.09** 
 (107.50) (54.13) (92.57) (18.47) 
     
Unemployed with High Educ. in LF 3.02 -4.29 4.78 -1.33 
 (31.55) (15.72) (25.60) (4.91) 
     
Overall Unemployment Rate 48.25** 8.64 20.81 9.15* 
 (20.02) (10.39) (14.13) (4.59) 
     
Observations 171 150 145 166 
Notes to Table 3.7: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, 
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed 
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents 
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of the unemployed with primary and higher 
(secondary or tertiary) education. For comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the estimates of the overall 
unemployment rate instead of the labor force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that are clustered at the 
country level are presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** 
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the 
sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences 
across countries, respectively. 
 
 
The labor force share of the long-term unemployed males is positively associated with all 
property crimes. Conditional on the unemployment of other groups, a one percentage point 
increase in the labor force share of the males with long-term unemployment is associated with 
about 9%, 11%, 7% and 21% increase in the total thefts, burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle 
thefts. These elasticities may seem to be too high, but notice that the mean of the labor force 
share of the long-term unemployed males is about two percent. A one percentage point increase 
from the base line of two percent corresponds to a 50% increase. 
 
 
3.5 Instrumental Variables 
 
 As discussed in the empirical framework section, unemployment can be endogenous in a 
crime regression. Although using a country-level panel data set minimizes this concern, there 
may be other reasons that motivate IV estimation such as measurement errors and unobserved 
confounding factors. Therefore, I estimate IV models where the unemployment rate is 
instrumented by several instrumental variables. 
First instrument is the exchange rate weighted by the manufacturing sector‟s value added 
to the country‟s GDP in previous year. This instrument is similar to the one used by Lin (2008) 
for his analysis of crime and unemployment in US, and by Oster and Agell (2007) for their 
analyses of crime and unemployment in Sweden. The impact of the exchange rate on the 
unemployment rate is theoretically well-founded.
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 When the exchange rate appreciates, goods 
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and services in the country become more expensive compared to the rest of the world. This leads 
to a decrease in foreign demand for domestic goods and an increase in domestic demand for 
foreign goods. As a result, exports and eventually production in the domestic country declines 
which increases the unemployment rate. That is, if the exchange is calculated as the amount of 
domestic currency per U.S. dollar, then theoretically there should be an inverse relationship 
between the exchange rate and the unemployment rate. Following the previous literature, I 
weighted the exchange rate movements with the manufacturing sector‟s value added in previous 
year. 
The second and third instruments are constructed using disasters experienced by 
countries. Data on occurrence of such disasters are obtained from EM-DAT (the international 
disaster data base).
92
  For an event to be included in the EM-DAT database as a disaster, it has to 
satisfy certain criteria. First, the event must be unforeseen and sudden. Because of this criterion, 
the events included in the EM-DAT database are unquestionably random. Secondly, the event 
must fit at least one of the following categories: A) 10 or more people got killed; B) 100 or more 
people got affected
93
; C) the affected country declared a state of emergency; D) the affected 
country called for international assistance. Consequently, the events listed in the EM-DAT 
database can be considered to have caused great damage, destruction and human suffering. 
One of the instruments that are created based on disasters is the occurrence of industrial 
accidents in a country. EM-DAT defines an industrial accident as a technological accident of an 
industrial nature or involving industrial buildings such as factories. Examples of industrial 
accidents include collapse or explosion of mines, destruction of industrial buildings or 
infrastructure and spill of hazardous/chemical materials. The list of industrial accidents in the 
sample used is presented in Table 3.10. 
Industrial accidents can be related to employment through two mechanisms. First, 
industrial accidents lead to shut-down of a plant/factory and therefore cause termination of 
employment of the workers. Secondly, because of the spill-over effects, employment in other 
plants/factories may be affected as well. Specifically, the production of the businesses that use 
the output of the closed plant/factory as an input in their production is expected to reduce. 
Similarly, the production of the businesses that supply inputs to the closed factory/plant is 
expected to decrease. Consequently, the employment in such businesses is likely to decrease as 
well as the employment in the firm affected by the accident.  
The mechanism can be explained better using an example of, say, a coal mine and a 
transportation company that delivers the coal from the mine to other locations. When the coal 
mine collapses, the production of the coal mine stops or gets reduced. This reduces the 
employment in the coal mine. Further, the services of the transportation company will not be 
needed which may lead to a reduction of employment in the transportation company. The 
collapse of the coal mine will also reduce the employment in other businesses which use coal as 
an intermediate good. 
As a result, an increase in the unemployment rate is expected due to the industrial 
accidents. The influence of industrial accidents on unemployment must be greater for the 
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 According to the EM-DAT, a person is considered affected if he/she has required immediate assistance during a 
period of emergency, i.e. requirement of basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate 





countries with greater employment in manufacturing sector. Other things equal, manufacturing 
employment is greater in the countries whose contribution of the manufacturing sector to the 
GDP. As a result, I use the interaction of the indicator variable for the occurrence of industrial 
accidents in a country with the share of manufacturing sector‟s value-added to GDP in previous 
year as an instrument. 
The third instrument is the occurrence of earthquakes. An earthquake is defined as the 
shaking and displacement of ground due to seismic waves by EM-DAT. As mentioned above, 
these earthquakes were large enough to influence the lives of many individuals. The list of 
earthquakes (observed by EM-DAT) in the sample used is provided in Table 3.11. 
Generally speaking, in the area where an earthquake is observed, buildings and the 
infrastructure are destroyed or damaged and people are killed or injured and so on.  Therefore, 
the initial influence of an earthquake in the local area where it is observed is a reduction in 
employment. There are multiple papers which show that the area struck by an earthquake suffers 
extensive economic losses For example, Cavallo, Powell and Becerra (2010) show that the Haiti 
earthquake of 2010 has cost at least eight billion dollars to Haitians. Holden, Bahls, and Real 
(2007) forecast that an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.9 in the Bay Area in Northern 
California could result in a loss of employment in the Bay area by about 420,000. 
Although the initial effect of disasters such as earthquakes can be devastating in the local 
area affected, in the longer run both the local and the aggregate labor market improve. That is, 
despite its initial damage on the local areas, an earthquake can improve the economic conditions 
in the country as a whole in the longer run. The mechanism involves the reconstruction efforts in 
the shaken locality. Specifically, in the local area hit by an earthquake, the demand for goods and 
services such as demand for health care and especially construction services go up. In such a 
case, employment opportunities for those individuals who are not affected by the earthquake can 
get improved. This is demonstrated by Pereira (2009) who studies the economic impact of 1755 
Lisbon Earthquake which is the largest natural catastrophe ever recorded in Europe. Pereira 
(2009) argues that the earthquake lead to a rise in the wage premium of construction workers due 
to the reconstruction efforts. Using evidence from hurricanes (which are similar to earthquakes), 
Ewing and Kruse (2005) suggest that “hurricanes may have a short run adverse impact on a 
community; however, these storms may also be associated with a long run positive impact on 
economic activity.” Similarly, Ewing, Kruse and Thompson (2009) argue that 1999 Oklahoma 
City tornado led to improvements in the labor market at the aggregate level. In the light of the 




The 2SLS estimates of the impact of the unemployment rate on thefts, burglaries, 
larcenies and motor vehicle thefts are presented in Panels 1 to 4 of Table 3.12. Panels for each 
crime also provide the first stage results and test statistics pertaining to validity and strength of 
the instruments (F statistic for the strength and J statistic for the validity). Notice that there are 
differences between the samples used in each panel. Due to the unavailability of the outcome 
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 Using earthquakes as an instrument, I assume that earthquakes do not directly influence crime, but only through 
the changes through the unemployment rate. This is indeed in line with the previous research. For example, using 
the Hurricane Katrina which was very destructive for New Orleans, Varano et.al. (2010) argue that there was not 
significantly large increases in the crime rates of Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix which received largest 
numbers of displaced New Orleans residents due to Hurricane Katrina. Moreover, since the number of instruments is 
greater than the number of endogenous variables, I conduct test for over-identifying restrictions. In this test, the null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 




variable, the sample sizes of burglary and larceny rate are much smaller than sample sizes of 
theft rate and meter vehicle theft.
 95
 In the first column of each panel, the OLS estimate of the 
unemployment rate is given for comparison purposes. In each panel, columns 2 to 5 provide the 
2SLS estimates where a different combination of the instruments is used in the first stage. 
Specifically, second columns present the estimates of 2SLS model where exchange rate, 
industrial accidents and earthquakes are included as instruments jointly. In columns 3, 4 and 5, 
exchange rate and industrial accidents; exchange rate and earthquakes; and industrial accidents 
and earthquakes are used as instruments, respectively. 
For all samples the interaction of the exchange rate with the lagged manufacturing share 
of GDP is a strong instrument. The other instruments, industrial accidents and earthquakes are 
not always strong instruments. Especially for the Burglary rate (Panel 2) and Larceny rate (Panel 
3) samples, earthquakes and industrial accidents are not significant determinants of the 
unemployment rate. This is due to the reduced variation in industrial accidents and earthquakes  
in burglary rate and larceny rate samples.96 Nonetheless, the F-statistic for the instruments in the 
first stage is around 10 which is the rule of thumb threshold for a weak instrument suggested by 
Stock and Watson (2003).97 Admittedly, in some cases, the instruments barely pass this 
threshold. However, the lowest F-statistic is about 9 (excluding the specification in the 5th 
columns of Panels 2 and 3 with smaller samples and weaker instruments of industrial accidents 
and earthquakes).  
In addition, Table 3.12 presents the J-statistic. This is a test of over-identifying 
restrictions.98 With the exception of the larceny rate in Panel 3, all of the crime categories pass 
the over-identification test. Moreover, most of the J-statistics are smaller than two. This indicates 
that the 2SLS method is insensitive to the choice of instrumental variables. 
According to the OLS estimates in columns 1 of each panel, a one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with 1.7%, 0.8%, 1.3%, 3% increase in thefts, 
burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts. 2SLS estimation (columns 2-5) produces larger 
point estimates. For example, the 2SLS estimations of unemployment elasticity for theft rate 
using different sets of instrumental variables range from 2.4 to 3.8 percent. These estimates are 
larger than the OLS estimates. However, in 3 out of 4 cases, OLS point estimate for the 
unemployment rate is within one standard error distance from the 2SLS point estimate (columns 
2, 3 and 5 of Panel 1). In one case, OLS estimate is much smaller than the 2SLS estimate 
(column 4 of Panel 1), but still, it is within two standard errors distance. 
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 Depending on the availability of the outcome variable, the sample sizes differ for each panel. Also sample size in 
Table 3.12 is smaller than the size of the sample used in Table 3.5 (OLS results). This is due to the missing data on 
instruments for some years and countries. 
96
 For example, the sign of the industrial accident is always positive in all samples but insignificant in burglary and 
larceny samples. This is just due to the smaller sample size. Table 3.12 presents change of sign for earthquake. This 
is due to fact that Greece and Italy are not in the burglary and larceny samples. Greece and Italy account for about 
half of the earthquakes in the estimation sample. See Table 3.11 for details. 
97
 The null hypothesis is that all coefficient estimates of the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression are 
not jointly different from zero. 
98
 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 




Table 3.8 Crime and Education & Gender-Specific Unemployment 
 Theft Burglary Larceny Vehicle 
Theft 
Unemployed Males with Primary education in LF 393.39* 167.93 131.1 91.73** 
 (235.66) (148.59) (179.67) (40.37) 
     
Unemployed Females with Primary education in LF 14.4 -32.42 75.3 -6.53 
 (237.52) (152.85) (221.60) (41.67) 
     Unemployed Males with High education in LF 68.34 65.89 77.64 12.22 
 (102.25) (64.17) (105.02) (20.47) 
     Unemployed Females with High education in LF -80.17 -90.17 -85.68 -18.09 
 (126.57) (74.44) (148.16) (25.83) 
     
Overall Unemployment Rate 48.25** 8.64 20.81 9.15* 
 (20.02) (10.39) (14.13) (4.59) 
     
Observations 171 150 145 166 
Notes to Table 3.8: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, 
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed 
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents 
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of the unemployed males and females with 
primary and higher (secondary or tertiary) education. For comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the 
estimates of the overall unemployment rate instead of the labor force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that 
are clustered at the country level are presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country 
population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and 
years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime 
definitions differences across countries, respectively. 
 
 
This similarity between the OLS and 2SLS estimates can be observed for other crime 
categories as well. For example, the 2SLS estimates of unemployment elasticity for burglary rate 
range between 2.8 and 4.2 percent and for motor vehicle theft between 5.7 and 7 percent. Similar 
to the theft rate, for burglaries and motor vehicle thefts OLS point estimates are smaller than the 
2SLS estimates, but they are generally within two standard errors distance from the 2SLS point 
estimates. 
The results in this section indicate a positive impact of the unemployment rate on 
property crimes after accounting for endogeneity of unemployment. The 2SLS point estimates 
are larger than the OLS estimates. However, the difference between the 2SLS and OLS estimates 
are not significant. In the context of the similarity between 2SLS and OLS estimates, these 
results are in line with Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002). 
 
3.6 Economic Impact of Crime Due to Recessions 
 
 In this section, I simulate the economic impact of one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate on crime. The back-of-the-envelope calculations rely on the cost of crime 





Table 3.9 Crime and Unemployment Duration 
  Theft Burglary Larceny Vehicle 
Theft 
Long-term Unemployed Males in LF 225.75*** 105.81** 114.38* 57.24** 
  (81.12) (45.61) (60.35) (24.40) 
Short-term Unemployed Males in LF 150.52 107.85*** 129.78 22.1 
  (119.04) (36.51) (87.00) (19.83) 
Long-term Unemployed Females in LF -331.98** -211.88*** -188.69** -49.6 
  (137.26) (47.15) (80.92) (36.23) 
Short-term Unemployed Females in LF 121.71 16.13 44.88 10.94 
  (108.07) (36.81) (107.53) (30.25) 
          
Overall Unemployment Rate 35.90*** 4.73 23.99*** 11.25*** 
  (11.03) (7.57) (8.28) (2.87) 
          
Observations 154 138 132 148 
Notes to Table 3.9: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, 
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed 
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents 
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of the long and short-term unemployed males and 
females. For comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the estimates of the overall unemployment rate instead 
of the labor force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are presented in 
parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide 
the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences across countries, respectively. 
 
 
Based on Anderson (1999)‟s estimates, I calculate each property crime costs about 
$46,000 in US in 1999 dollars. The calculations are summarized in Table 3.13. Thefts in the 
European Sourcebook include thefts of all kinds such as burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle 
thefts. That is, aggregate property crime rate in the Uniform Crime Reports of FBI corresponds 
to the theft rate in this paper. Therefore, I use $46,000 as the cost of one theft in this analysis.  
The OLS estimates in this paper as well as those in previous studies suggest that a one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with about one to two percent 
increase in thefts. Consequently, a one percentage point rise in the overall unemployment rate 
translates into about 25,000-30,000 extra thefts for a country with population similar to France, 
Italy or UK (50-60 million). Therefore, for each percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate, the French, Italians and Britons incur about $1.2 – $1.4 billion additional cost due to crime. 
The 2SLS estimates in this paper draw a more pessimistic picture. According to the 2SLS 
estimates, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases theft rate by about 
2.4 – 3.8 percent. These elasticities translate into about $1.6 – $2.5 billion additional cost of 







Table 3.10 Industrial Accidents 
Year Country Location Sub Type Detail 
1998 Austria Lassing Collapse Mine 
2001 Denmark Baltic sea Other Fuel 
2001 France Toulouse Explosion Petro-chemical factory AZF 
2003 France Saint-Nazaire Collapse Ocean liner Queen Mary 2 
2000 Hungary 
 
Chemical Spill Cyanide 
1999 Ireland Belmullet Fire 
 1997 Italy Turin Poisoning Food 
1997 Norway Barentsburg Explosion Coal mine 
2002 Poland Jastrzebie Zdroj Explosion Mine Jast-Mos 
2001 Romania Vulcan Explosion Coal mine 
2001 Romania Iasi Poisoning Cyanure 
1995 Slovenia Mezica Fire Waste dumping 
1998 Turkey Istanbul Explosion Bazar Egyptian 
1999 Turkey Istanbul Chemical Spill 
 1998 Ukraine Donetsk Explosion Mine 
1996 UK Wales Chemical Spill Petrol 
1996 UK Aiskew  Explosion Gas storage depot 
1997 UK Cadoxton Chemical Spill Vinyl Chloride Monomer 
 
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion  
 
This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a panel data set of 33 
European countries, and it is one of the few papers which studies crime in an international 
context. The primary advantage of the data set is that it contains consistently measured crime 
variables across countries and over time.  
The findings presented in this paper are consistent with the previous literature. I find that 
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases thefts by about 2 percent 
using OLS. Although unemployment can be endogenous in a crime regression, using a country-
level panel data set minimizes this concern. My 2SLS estimation using the exchange rate, 
industrial accidents and earthquakes as instruments for the unemployment rate supports this 
hypothesis. 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, but the difference between OLS 
and 2SLS estimates is not significant. This finding is similar to the conclusion of Gould, 
Weinberg and Mustard (2002). 
Because the overall unemployment rate may not be able to identify people on the margin 
of committing a crime (Lin 2008 and Raphael Winter-Ebmer 2001), the influences of gender-
specific, education-specific and duration-specific unemployment on crime are investigated. The 
overall unemployment rate is decomposed into labor force shares of unemployed males and 
females, unemployed individuals with poor and well education and unemployed individuals with 
a short and long unemployment spell. The results show that the unemployment of males, 
individuals with poor education, and individuals with longer unemployment spells are significant 
determinants of the impact of the unemployment rate on crime. Most of the influence of the 
overall unemployment rate on crime can be attributable to the unemployment of males who are 




Table 3.11 Earthquakes 
Year Country   Location   
1998 Austria Arnoldstein 
1996 Croatia Ston, Slano area 
2002 Georgia Tbilisi area 
1996 Greece Konitsa 
1999 Greece Athens Suburbs of Menidi 
2000 Greece Mihalitsi, Mitikas, Flabo 
2001 Greece Aegean sea 
2002 Greece Bartholomio 
2003 Greece Lefkada 
1997 Italy Umbria, Marche regions 
1998 Italy Gualdo Tadino-Nocera 
2002 Italy Sicily, Palermo 
2002 Italy San Guliano di Puglia 
2002 Italy Zafferana Etnea, Giarre 
2003 Italy Alessandria (Piemont) 
1998 Slovenia Bovec, Trenta, Kobarid 
1996 Turkey Corum-Amasya 
1998 Turkey Kayseri 
1998 Turkey Ceyhan, Adana area 
1998 Turkey Adana, Ceyhan, Hatay 
1999 Turkey Duzce, Bolu, Kaynasli 
1999 Turkey Sakarya Province 
1999 Turkey Izmit 
1999 Turkey Marmaris 
1999 Turkey Kocaeli, Bursa, Istanbul 
1999 Turkey Izmit, Kocaeli, Yalova 
  
 
The magnitude of the unemployment‟s impact on crime is economically significant. For 
example, France, Italy or UK suffer about 25,000-30,000 additional larcenies, burglaries and 
motor vehicle thefts per year for one percentage point increase in the unemployment. The cost of 
each property crime can be roughly approximated to be $46,000 in 1999 dollars. Due to one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the French, Italian and British incur an extra 
crime cost of about $1.2-$1.4 billion according to the OLS estimates or $1.6 – $2.4 billion 
according to the 2SLS estimates.99 
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Table 3.12 2SLS Estimates of Unemployment on Crime 
Panel 1: Theft Rate  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Unemployment Rate 48.390*** 77.810** 70.747** 110.376*** 72.049 
   (13.662) (36.784) (32.188) (31.958) (47.157) 
Number of Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
J statistic 
 
0.992 0.426 0.200 0.777 
P-value of the J statistic   0.609 0.514 0.655 0.378 
      
First Stage Results 
     
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1  
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 













    (0.279)   (0.174) (0.279) 
F statistic for weak IV 
 
8.924 9.697 10.634 10.776 
P-value for weak IV   0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Panel 2: Burglary Rate  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Unemployment Rate 7.266 39.908* 34.948** 26.511*** 51.645 
   (10.615) (20.729) (17.453) (9.676) (54.813) 
Number of Observations 145 145 145 145 145 
J statistic 
 
2.391 0.050 2.158 2.369 
P-value of the J statistic   0.303 0.823 0.142 0.124 
      
First Stage Results 
     
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1  
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 













    (0.575)   (0.467) (0.577) 
F statistic for weak IV 
 
9.395 14.458 11.156 1.135 









Table 3.12 continued 
Panel 3: Larceny Rate  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Unemployment Rate 22.977* 18.125 14.989 54.719*** -43.401 
   (12.790) (23.731) (25.381) (9.832) (35.224) 
Number of Observations 141 141 141 141 141 
J statistic 
 
3.856 3.539 2.055 1.201 
P-value of the J statistic   0.145 0.060 0.152 0.273 
      First Stage Results 
     
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1  
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 













    (0.579)   (0.469) (0.579) 
F statistic for weak IV 
 
9.150 14.044 11.087 1.115 
P-value for weak IV   0.000 0.000 0.001 0.347 
 
 
 Panel 4: Vehicle Theft Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Unemployment Rate 11.176*** 20.467** 21.331** 3.791 25.074** 
   (3.133) (8.050) (9.242) (10.307) (11.174) 
Number of Observations 166 166 166 166 166 
J statistic 
 
1.074 1.017 0.003 0.333 
P-value of the J statistic   0.584 0.313 0.958 0.564 
      First Stage Results 
     
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1  
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 













    (0.277)   (0.175) (0.275) 
F statistic for weak IV 
 
9.075 9.544 10.400 10.919 
P-value for weak IV   0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Notes to Table 3.12: The method of estimation is indicated at the top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of 
Burglaries, Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables. The upper 
panels present the results from the 2
nd
 stage. The bottom panels provide estimates of the 1
st
 stage where the 
unemployment rate is regressed on the instruments. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are 
presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. 





Table 3.13 Cost per Property Crime 
Anderson (1999)‟s 
estimate of cost of 
crime 
Crime-induced production ($397 billion) + Opportunity costs ($130 billion) + 
Risks to life and health ($574 billion) – Transfers from victims to offenders 
($603 billion) = $1,102 billion. [From Table 7 in Anderson (1999)] 
Number of Property 
Crimes in 1999 
1,380,000 
Number of Violent 
Crimes in 1999 
10,120,000 
Total Cost of 
Violent Crimes 
Risks to life and health ($574 billion) + 12% * Remaining Costs ($531 billion) 
= $638 billion 
Total Cost of 
Property Crimes 
88% * $531 billion = $467 billion 
Cost per Property 
crime 
$467 billion / 10,120,000 = $46,000 
Notes to Table 3.13: Since the Index-I crimes of FBI are the costliest to the society, I assume that all of these costs 
are incurred due to Index-I crimes (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft). All of the 
costs associated with Risks to life and health are assigned to violent crimes. The remaining costs are allocated to 


















Tourism is typically regarded as a major industry in many countries, and particularly 
desirable one, since it is relatively low in energy consumption and pollution. Tourism generates 
about 7.3% of the total worldwide exports
100
. For some countries, tourism is the main source of 
income and foreign currency, and many local economies heavily depend on tourism. 
This paper investigates the possibility that crime creates an externality in the form of 
reduction in international tourism activity. Although the impact of economic activity on crime 
has been investigated extensively (Corman and Mocan 2000, Levitt 1998, Block and Heineke 
1975), there are a few studies that analyzed the influence of crime on economic activity. For 
example, Cullen and Levitt (1999) report that individuals move away from areas with high crime 
rates. Peri (2004) argues that organized crime is associated with low economic development. 
Further, despite its economic importance, tourism received very little attention in this context. 
There are only a handful of studies that investigated whether tourism activity (as a part of overall 
economic activity) is influenced by crime using data obtained from small geographic regions. 
For example, Levantis and Gani (2000) find that increased crime is associated with less tourism 
activity using time-series data from South Pacific and the Caribbeans. McPheters and Stronge 
(1974) report that property crime is positively correlated with the number of tourists in Miami. 
Howsen and Jarrell (1987 and 1990) argue that an increase in the number of tourists is associated 
with an increase in the property crimes. However, these cross-sectional or time-series analyzes 
have limitations, such as the inability to control for unobservable area characteristics. 
Furthermore, the results from the studies that focus on one specific location may not be 
generalizable. Using a panel data set of European countries covering years 1995 to 2003, this 
paper investigates the influence of crime on international tourism activity and the differential 
responsiveness of tourism by region. The findings suggest that violent crimes (homicide, rape, 
robbery and assault) are negatively associated with incoming international tourists and with 
tourism revenue for an average country in Europe. 
The negative influence of crime on tourism activity is not surprising theoretically. Crime 
is a demand shifter for tourism. When individuals decide about whether to take a holiday and 
where to spend that holiday, they would take the risk of victimization into account. Other things 
being equal, potential tourists are more likely to visit countries with smaller risk of victimization.  
However, individuals do not have a true measure of victimization risk in the destination 
country; they can only have a perception about it. This ex-ante expectation about being 
victimized in the destination country can be formed by obtaining information through various 
channels, such as print or electronic media or word-of-mouth
101
. Regardless of the source of the 
information, the actual crime rate in the destination country can be a proxy for the perceived risk 
of being victimized. In this paper, this proxy (the crime rate) is used in the empirical analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II has a discussion of the empirical 
framework and the data employed in the analysis. Section III summarizes the results and Section 
IV concludes. 
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 World Tourism Organisation (http://www.world-tourism.org/facts/tmt.html). 
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4.2 Empirical Framework and Data 
 
Weather conditions and touristic attractions are the main determinants of tourism activity 
for a country (Richardson and Loomis 2004, Lyssiotou 2000). Other influential factors may 
include quality of the health services, prevalence of diseases, economic development and various 
socio-economic characteristics of the country. This paper hypothesizes that the perception of 
victimization risk is a determinant of the demand for tourism by the international visitors.  
Following the guidelines described above, the estimated equation is depicted below: 
 
(4.1)  Tc,t = α + βCrimec,t-1 + γSc,t + µc + τt + εc,t 
 
where Tc,t  stands for international tourists visiting country c in year t per 10 residents, or real 
international tourism revenue per 10 residents
102
. Both variables are obtained from World 
Development Indicators.  
I assume that the potential tourists‟ perceptions of victimization can be proxied by the 
actual crime rate in the destination country. Crimec,t-1  denotes the number of crimes per 100,000 
residents in country c in year t. Following Corman and Mocan (2000) and Levitt (1998), crime 
rate is lagged by one year to avoid potential reverse causality. Both violent crimes (homicides, 
assaults, rapes, robberies) and property crimes (thefts and burglaries) are analyzed. Crime data 
are obtained from European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice. 
The vector Sc,t  controls for the unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, exchange rate, 
urbanization rate, number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, prevalence of tuberculosis, teenage 
pregnancy rate and the ratio of old people to young people in the country
103
. Time invariant 
factors that may influence the international tourism activity such as a country's historical sites, its 
coastline's length and average temperature and other unobservable country characteristics are 
captured by country fixed effects (µc). Regressions also include time dummies represented by τt.  
 
 
4.2.1 Potential Endogeneity 
 
It can be argued that the crime rate in the estimated equation may be endogenous. 
Specifically, as the number of tourists visiting a country goes up, crime in that country may rise. 
This is because, the incoming tourists are presumably wealthy and they may increase the 
expected return for criminals. In fact, McPheters and Stronge (1974) and Howsen and Jarrell 
(1987 and 1990) argue that an increase in the number of tourists increases property crimes.
104
  
However, these papers do not have strong empirical designs as they employ cross-
sectional or time series data sets. Time series data from one geographical location do not include 
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 The mean of tourists per 10 residents is 7.2 and that of the tourism revenue per 10 residents is $4942.56 
103
The source of labor market variables and income, teen pregnancy and urban population controls is the World 
Development Indicators. The ratio of old population to the young population is constructed using the data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau's International database. Alcohol consumption per capita variable is obtained from the World 
Health Organization‟s Global Alcohol Database. 
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 These authors do not find a relationship between tourism activity and violent crime. This may be because, when 
tourists (who are presumably wealthy) visit a country, the expected return to criminal activities such as theft and 
burglary goes up, since incoming tourists may increase the number of targets from whom valuable assets can be 
stolen by the potential criminals. However, there are no direct incentives for committing a violent crime, such as 




any kind of comparison group. With cross sectional data, unobserved heterogeneity that can 
impact both the crime rate and the tourism activity cannot be controlled for. Therefore, using 
cross sectional or time series data sets may lead to biased estimates. This paper, on the other 
hand, uses a panel data set which allows for inclusion of country fixed effects and year dummies 
to capture the time-invariant unobservable country characteristics. 
Further, in the estimated equation, the crime rate is lagged by one year to overcome a 
potential reverse causality. The rationale behind this approach is that tourists that visit a country 
in a specific year cannot influence the crime rate of that country in the previous year. Same 
method has been employed by Corman and Mocan (2000) and Levitt (1998) even in the context 







Table 4.1 presents the results from the specification where the number of international 
tourism revenue per 10 residents is the dependent variable. Total violent crime rate (which 
consists of homicide, rape, robbery and assault) have a significant negative impact on receipts 
from international tourists. All of the components of violent crime are also associated negatively 
with tourism revenue separately
106
. On the other hand, aggregate property crime or its 
components (theft and burglary) do not have a significant influence. Elasticity estimates of 
international tourism revenue per 10 residents in the host country with respect to aggregate 
violent crime, homicide, rape and assault rates are -0.08, -0.14, -0.13 and -0.07, respectively. 
Similar results, which are displayed in Table 4.2, are obtained from the specification where the 
number of international tourists per 10 residents in the host country is the dependent variable. 
Elasticities of international tourists per 10 residents with respect to aggregate violent crime, 
homicide and assault rates are -0.07, -0.28 and -0.07, respectively. 
Crime's impact on international tourism may differ between countries. Similar to the 
trade-off between risk and return (Fama and MacBeth 1973), if international tourists are highly 
attracted to a country's touristic prospects, the crime rate in that country may not be a significant 
deterrent for international tourists. In other words, the attractiveness of a country may partly 
compensate for the probability of victimization. According to the World Tourism 
Organization
107
, 50% of all international tourists visit a foreign country for leisure and 
recreation. According to this criterion, Southern Europe is a more attractive tourist destination 
compared to Northern Europe, since Southern European countries have longer coastlines 
available for sea tourism, more historical artifacts and mountainous terrain that offer 
opportunities for skiing. 
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 Specifically, these authors use one period lagged arrest rates to explain the variation in crime. 
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Table 4.1 Impact of Crime on International Tourism Revenue 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Violent 
Crime Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
Property 
Crime Theft Burglary 
Crime Listed -1.750*** -260.780** -80.812* -1.561 -2.236*** 0.251 0.440 0.365 
 
(0.570) (104.465) (41.445) (2.886) (0.631) (0.241) (0.286) (0.721) 
Unemployment Rate -23.391 -76.474* -38.060 -39.758 -42.364 -68.461 -44.982 -68.297 
 
(48.014) (38.677) (46.972) (46.383) (47.443) (60.332) (45.248) (61.021) 
GDP Growth Rate -12.595 -12.848 6.175 0.740 -3.785 0.401 6.576 -4.987 
 
(30.746) (31.206) (28.254) (29.046) (30.079) (37.601) (29.519) (38.223) 
% Urban Population -0.203 22.470 -4.127 -8.884 -2.430 -131.037 -12.247 -137.459 
 
(129.571) (96.464) (126.984) (121.600) (126.175) (143.042) (125.285) (140.487) 
Teen Pregnancy Rate 9.957** 13.702*** 8.838** 7.951* 10.230** 13.351* 9.609** 12.744 
 
(4.117) (4.731) (4.012) (4.384) (4.441) (7.593) (4.115) (8.047) 
Tuberculosis Rate -26.405 -16.754 -26.489 -30.171 -26.494 -38.577 -29.824 -38.157 
 
(21.298) (32.426) (21.364) (21.795) (21.813) (30.290) (20.810) (30.352) 
Hospital Beds -33.967 -8.806 -26.475 -43.386 -7.476 -142.702 -16.643 -173.263 
 
(231.457) (239.036) (209.681) (206.042) (217.060) (264.878) (212.364) (267.365) 
Old / Young -3.519 37.393 23.396 -0.934 -7.620 -39.616 -13.737 -35.268 
 
(62.294) (62.339) (60.755) (62.255) (64.198) (61.857) (60.049) (62.935) 
Exchange Rate -3.695 241.521 -2.830 -3.256 -3.477 -2.769 -2.741 -3.064 
 
(2.263) (217.064) (1.831) (2.167) (2.255) (2.999) (2.094) (3.114) 
Observations 181 162 192 193 190 156 192 156 
Notes to Table 4.1: The dependent variable is international tourism revenue per 10 residents.  In each column the first row represents the coefficient of the crime 
rate listed on the top. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Each 




Table 4.2 Impact of Crime on International Tourists 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Violent 
Crime Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
Property 
Crime Theft Burglary 
Crime Listed -0.002*** -0.691*** -0.059 -0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001* 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.146) (0.050) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate -0.035 -0.130** -0.044 -0.047 -0.042 -0.078 -0.041 -0.071 
 
(0.069) (0.063) (0.065) (0.060) (0.066) (0.082) (0.064) (0.082) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.057 0.052 0.074* 0.071* 0.065 0.081 0.081* 0.070 
 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.052) (0.041) (0.051) 
% Urban Population 0.051 0.033 0.051 0.040 0.070 -0.053 0.045 -0.071 
 
(0.162) (0.111) (0.158) (0.136) (0.163) (0.165) (0.144) (0.166) 
Teen Pregnancy Rate -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.016 -0.007 -0.016 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) 
Tuberculosis Rate -0.085** -0.111* -0.085** -0.086** -0.081** -0.103** -0.082** -0.096* 
 
(0.038) (0.057) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.050) (0.037) (0.048) 
Hospital Beds 0.224 0.280 0.297 0.298 0.360 0.206 0.328 0.096 
 
(0.232) (0.220) (0.232) (0.234) (0.230) (0.281) (0.244) (0.267) 
Old / Young 0.048 0.088 0.058 0.036 0.031 -0.005 0.018 0.007 
 
(0.073) (0.075) (0.079) (0.085) (0.075) (0.061) (0.070) (0.062) 
Exchange Rate -0.004 0.065 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.109) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Observations 182 156 193 194 191 152 193 152 
Notes to Table 4.2: The dependent variable is international tourists per 10 residents. In each column the first row represents the coefficient of the crime rate 
listed on the top. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Each regression 




Table 4.3 Impact of Violent Crimes on International Tourism in North versus South Europe 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents 
  Violent Crime Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
 
North South North South North South North South North South 
Crime Listed -1.572* -1.384 -93.582 -221.780 -87.875*** 21.866 0.421 -2.876 -2.064** -1.523 
 
(0.749) (4.987) (119.766) (237.409) (22.968) (169.031) (3.683) (8.004) (0.948) (5.308) 
Observations 79 102 79 83 87 105 87 106 87 103 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: International Tourists per 10 Residents 
 
Violent Crime Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
 
North South North South North North South North South North 
Crime Listed -0.002** -0.006 -0.493** -0.573 -0.024 0.035 0.001 -0.013 -0.003** -0.007 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.193) (0.377) (0.055) (0.088) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) 
Observations 77 105 77 79 85 108 85 109 85 106 
Notes to Table 4.3: North and South samples are separated by the latitude 50 North. Full set of control variables (as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are included in the 
regressions. The coefficients presented are those of the crime rates listed on the top of each column. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 




To investigate whether crime impacts tourism differently in Southern versus Northern 
Europe, I estimate the model described in section II using two sub-samples. Countries whose 
average latitude is above (below) 50 North are included in the Northern (Southern) sample
108
. In 
the interest of space, only the coefficients of the violent crimes are reported in Table 4.3. As 
presented in Panel A of Table 4.3, more rapes, assaults and aggregate violent crimes are 
associated with less tourism revenue in Northern sample, but not in the Southern sample
 109
. 
Similar findings are displayed in Panel B of Table 4.3 which presents the estimates of violent 
crimes' separate components‟ (homicide, rape, robbery and assault) impacts on incoming 
international tourists. Tourists respond to aggregate violent crime, homicide and assault in 
Northern sample significantly whereas in Southern sample the impact is statistically 
insignificant. 
The results presented in Table 4.3 suggest that international tourism activity is not 
influenced by the crime rate in the Southern European Countries which are more attractive 
tourism destinations than Northern European countries. To investigate this differential response 
further, I divided the whole sample according to the sea tourism attractiveness of the countries 
and run the analysis in these samples separately. That is, the countries that have favorable 
conditions for sea tourism are included in “Attractive” sample and those countries that are not 
suitable for sea tourism are included in the “Unattractive” sample. Specifically, the countries that 
have a coastline and are located close to Equator
110
 are considered as “Attractive”. The 
remainder of the countries is included in the “Unattractive” sample
111
. 
In Panel A and B of Table 4.4, I present the results of the models where the whole sample 
is divided according to sea tourism attractiveness. Violent crimes significantly reduce both 
tourism revenue (Panel A) and international tourists (Panel B) only in the countries which are not 
suitable for sea tourism, or which are less attractive in terms of sea tourism.  
I further estimate models where the interaction of a country's average latitude with its 
crime rate is included as an independent variable. The main effect of the latitude cannot be 
included jointly with the interaction term as the models contain country fixed effects. The results 
presented in Table 4.5 indicate that the closer to the North Pole a country is, the larger the impact 
of violent crimes on tourism activity becomes (in absolute value). A 1% increase in the aggregate 
violent crime rate decreases the international tourism revenue per 10 residents by 
(0.00156×Latitude) percent. According to this estimate, for Iceland (which is located at the 
latitude 65 North), the elasticity of tourism revenue per 10 residents with respect to the aggregate 
violent crime rate is -0.101. The same elasticity for Cyprus (at 35 North) is -0.055. As shown in 
the Panel B of Table 4.5, similar results are obtained for international tourists.  
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 South sample consists of the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.. The countries in the North sample are Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom 
and Iceland. 
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 Similar results are obtained when 47.2 North (the median latitude) or 45 North is used to separate Northern 
European countries from Southern European countries. 
110
 Latitude is mechanically correlated with average temperature. If some place is closer to the Equator than, it 
receives rays of the Sun more directly throughout the year and have warmer temperatures over the year on average. 
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 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and 




Table 4.4 Impact of Violent Crimes on International Tourism in Attractive versus Unattractive Countries 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents  
 
Violent Crime Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Crime Listed -1.67*** 6.45 -130.64 -224.23 -61.34* -15.25 0.53 3.40 -2.41*** 16.59 
 
(0.53) (9.89) (140.17) (264.67) (33.33) (250.39) (3.95) (10.09) (0.61) (16.48) 
Attractive: No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 114 67 106 56 122 70 122 71 122 68 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents  
  Violent Crime Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Crime Listed -0.002*** -0.008 -0.482** -0.315 -0.032 0.000 -0.000 -0.014 -0.003*** -0.019 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.170) (0.441) (0.056) (0.165) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.015) 
Attractive: No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 111 71 99 57 119 74 119 75 119 72 
Notes to Table 4.4:  Countries in the “Attractive” sample are located below the latitude 50 North and have a coastline. Countries in the “Unattractive” sample are 
located above the Latitude 50 North or do not have a coastline. In each panel, the odd (even) numbered columns present the results from the unattractive 
(attractive) sample. Full set of control variables (as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are included in the regressions. The coefficients presented are those of the crime rates 




Table 4.5 Changing Impact of Violent Crimes on International Tourism According to 
Latitude 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Violent Crimes Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
Crime Listed x Latitude -3.242*** -436.008** -158.448** -2.487 -4.169*** 
 
(1.048) (174.465) (74.314) (5.287) (1.165) 
Observations 181 162 192 193 190 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Violent Crimes Homicide Rape Robbery Assault 
Crime Listed x Latitude -0.004*** -1.226*** -0.123 0.001 -0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.224) (0.099) (0.014) (0.002) 
Observations 182 156 193 194 191 
Notes to Table 4.5: The coefficients presented are those of the crime rates listed on the top of each column interacted 
with the latitude of the country. Full set of control variables (as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are included in the 
regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 





Using a panel data set of European countries, this paper investigates the impact of crime 
on international tourism activity. Violent crimes are negatively associated with incoming 
international tourists and international tourism revenue. The results suggest that tourists evaluate 
the risk of victimization when choosing a destination. Further, the analyzes show that the impact 
of violent crimes on international tourism activity in Northern Europe is stronger than it is in 
Southern Europe which has more touristic attractions. Especially, a country‟s sea tourism 
attractiveness may be a factor offsetting the effect of the risk of being victimized for potential 
tourists. This finding may be evidence for the hypothesis that the risk of victimization borne by 
the tourists is (partly) compensated by the touristic attractiveness of the country.  
The impact of crime on tourism is also economically significant. For example, for an 
average country with a population of 25 million, a 10% increase in aggregate violent crime rate 
leads to about $100 million (in 2000 dollars) decline in international tourism revenue. Using 
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000)'s locally-owned entertainment venue multiplier of 1.5 as a lower 





CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
The three pieces of my research presented in second, third and fourth chapters of this 
dissertation contribute to the economics of crime literature. Second chapter investigates the 
impact of shall-issue laws on crime. Third chapter analyzes the impact of unemployment on 
crime. Chapter four pointed out that cost of crime includes losses from tourism revenue.  
As explained in the second chapter, a shall-issue law allows law-abiding individuals to 
obtain a license to carry concealed handguns provided that they satisfy some requirements 
indicated by the law. Employing state-level or county-level data sets, previous studies report 
conflicting findings. Studies that find a positive (negative) impact of shall-issue laws on crime 
suggest that crime-facilitating (reducing) effect of shall-issue laws dominate the crime-reducing 
(facilitating) effect. There is no consensus on the net effect of shall-issue laws on crime. 
The previous studies on shall-issue laws overlook the fact that neither the crime-
facilitating nor the crime-reducing effect of shall-issue laws can emerge if individuals do not 
respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more frequently (first order effect). To 
investigate this question, second chapter tests whether the first order effect of a shall-issue law is 
actually realized using an individual-level data set. The mechanisms through which shall-issue 
laws increase or decrease crime cannot be at work if individuals do not respond to these laws by 
carrying handguns more frequently in the first place. 
The findings in this paper indicate that individuals start carrying handguns more often 
when they become eligible, i.e. when their states pass shall-issue laws or when they satisfy the 
minimum required age in an already-shall-issue state. This increase in handgun carrying 
behavior is a result of changes in behavior of law abiding individuals and those who are likely to 
commit minor crimes, such as drug possession, public order offenses or traffic offenses. After 
the enactment of a shall-issue law, no change is observed in the handgun carrying activity of 
individuals who are likely to commit serious offenses, such as assaults, rapes, manslaughters or 
robberies. These findings cast doubt on the presumed existence of the crime-facilitating effect of 
shall-issue laws. 
The third chapter investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a panel data 
set of 33 European countries, and it is one of the few papers which studies crime in an 
international context. The primary advantage of the data set is that it contains consistently 
measured crime variables across countries and over time. 
The findings presented show that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate increases property crimes by about two percent. Although unemployment can be 
endogenous in a crime regression, using a country-level panel data set minimizes this concern. 
My 2SLS estimation using the exchange rate, industrial accidents and earthquakes as instruments 
for the unemployment rate supports this hypothesis. 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS 
estimates, but the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates is not statistically significant. 
This finding is similar to the conclusion of Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002). 
The magnitude of the unemployment‟s impact on crime is economically significant. For 
example, France, Italy or UK suffer about 25,000-30,000 additional larcenies, burglaries and 
motor vehicle thefts per year for one percentage point increase in the unemployment. The cost of 
each property crime can be roughly approximated to be $46,000 in 1999 dollars. Due to one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the French, Italian and British incur an extra 




crime is mainly driven by the unemployment of males, individuals with poor education, and 
individuals with longer unemployment spells. 
The fourth chapter investigates the impact of crime on international tourism activity, 
using the panel data set of European countries which is introduced in the third chapter. Violent 
crimes are negatively associated with incoming international tourists and international tourism 
revenue. The results suggest that tourists evaluate the risk of victimization when choosing a 
destination. Further, the analyzes show that the impact of violent crimes on international tourism 
activity in Northern Europe is stronger than it is in Southern Europe which has more touristic 
attractions. Especially, a country‟s sea tourism attractiveness may be a factor offsetting the effect 
of the risk of being victimized for potential tourists. This finding may be evidence for the 
hypothesis that the risk of victimization borne by the tourists is (partly) compensated by the 
touristic attractiveness of the country.  
The impact of crime on tourism is also economically significant. For example, for an 
average country with a population of 25 million, a 10% increase in aggregate violent crime rate 
leads to about $100 million (in 2000 dollars) decline in international tourism revenue. Using 
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000)'s locally-owned entertainment venue multiplier of 1.5 as a lower 
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See the note C 
below 
http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/dwcl/index.php 
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Since prior to 1970 18 See note G below 
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-
5/atf-p-5300-5-new_hampshire.pdf 
New Jersey No 18 
Administrative 
Code 13:54-2.3 
of New Jersey 
www.njsp.org/info/pdf/firearms/njac-title13-ch54.pdf 
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Since prior to 1970 21 
South Carolina 
Code of Laws 23-
31-215 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t23c031.htm 
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Appendix continued 






 No 18 See note I below 
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-
5/atf-p-5300-5-wisconsin.pdf 





Notes to Appendix: 
A
 Alabama is considered a shall-issue state by Ayres and Donohue (2009) although it is a may-issue state by its law (Alabama Code 13A-11-75). 
B
 Alaska is originally an unrestricted state. However, since 1995, it also issues licenses to individuals who demand one. 
C
 California is a may-issue state and some argue that it is a de facto no-issue state. The Concealed Weapon Law of California does not state a minimum required 
age for the eligibility to obtain a license. The law and the standardized application documents (http://www.lasd.org/contact_us/inquiry/gen_pub_ccw_app.pdf) 
for a concealed weapon actually discourage individuals from applying. For example, it is explicitly stated that carrying a concealed gun is not a right, but a 
privilege. Therefore, to be consistent with the de facto conditions, age 21 is used as the minimum age requirement in the empirical analysis.  
D
 Because there is no concealed carry law in DC, the minimum age to register a gun is used in the empirical analysis for minimum age requirement. According to 
the Code of DC numbered 7-2502.03, no individual who is younger than 21years of age can register a gun. 
E
 Since Illinois is a no- issue state, the minimum age requirement for owning a gun is used in the empirical analysis. All individuals who own a firearm must 
have a Firearm Owner‟s Identification Card. According to Illinois Compiled Statue 65/4 all applicants to Firearm Owner‟s Identification Card must be 21 years 
old or older. 
F
 The Maryland state Statue 5–133 does not allow individuals below 21 years of age to possess a handgun. 
G
 In the state‟s Statues there is no age restriction listed. Therefore, the Federal minimum age requirement of 18 years is used in the empirical analysis. 
H
 Vermont is an unrestricted state. Therefore, it is considered to be a shall-issue state in the empirical analysis. Since the state does not have a concealed weapon 
law, the minimum age requirement for possession is used in the empirical analysis. According to the Vermont Statue Ch. 85 13-4008, only children under the age 
of 16 are considered to be delinquent if they possess a gun or have a gun in their control 
(http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullsection.cfm?Title=13&Chapter=085&Section=04008). This implies that the minimum age required to possess a gun is 16. 
However, the US Code Section 922 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00000922----000-.html) indicates that possession of firearm by an 
individual younger than 18 is unlawful. For this reason, age 18 is used in the empirical analysis as the minimum required age in Vermont. 
I
 Wisconsin is a no-issue state. Because of the lack of a concealed weapon law in Wisconsin the minimum age requirement regarding the possession of a firearm 
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